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The recurring conflict between religious manifestations and existing 
legal norms has resulted in a principled debate in legal theory and liberal 
political philosophy regarding the role of religion in law and politics.' Ex-
t L.L.B. and L.L.M. Utrecht University, the Netherlands; PhD-Candidate, Eras-
mus School of Law, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Draft versions of this article were 
presented in Lisbon ('XXVIII World Congress of the International Association for the 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy', University of Lisbon, 17-21 July 2017); 
London ('Association of Transnational Law Schools' Agora, Queen Mary University of 
London, 20 June 2017); Rabat ('Religion, Law, and Security' Conference, The Fifth 
Annual Conference of the African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies, Interna-
tional University of Rabat, 14-17 May 2017); Rotterdam ('Section Seminar Sociology 
Theory and Methodology', Erasmus School of Law, 8 May 2017); Malibu ('Religious 
Critiques of Law' Conference, Pepperdine School of Law, 8-9 March 2017); Utrecht 
('Winter meeting', The Netherlands Association for Philosophy of Law, 3 February 
2017) and The Hague ('PhD-Seminar', International Institute of Social Studies, 10 Jan-
uary 2017). For the feedback on the presentation, I would like to thank the organization 
committee and the participants of those events. Next, I am especially grateful for the 
helpful comments of Wibren van der Burg, Jeroen Temperman, Ellen Hey, Kim Lane 
Scheppele, Steven D. Smith, Joseph E. David, Yossi Nehushtan, M. Christian Green 
and Iris van Domselaar. Also, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreci-
ation to Jessica Gill, Michael Loza, Tyleana Venable and the rest of the Buffalo Human 
Rights Law Review staff for their valuable comments and fruitful suggestions. Errors 
remain mine. Feedback, comments and criticism could be sent directly to 
wahedi@law.eur.nl 
1. Robert Cochran and Michael Helfand expect that "given the potential for both 
law and religion to promote the most noble of human goods and the most depraved of 
human evils, the endless jousting between the two-each continuously seeking to tame 
the other-will undoubtedly remain a permanent feature of the human experience." 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The Competing Claims of Law and 
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 1051, 1052 (2013); see also 
Cdcile Laborde, Liberalism's Religion (2017); Arif A. Jamal, Considering Freedom of 
Religion in a Post-Secular Context: Hapless or Hopeful? 6 O.J.L.R. 433 (2017); Chris-
topher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 Va. L. Rev. 481 (2017); Steven D. 
Smith, The Tortuous Course of Religious Freedom, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1553, 1556 
(2016) (discussing three challenges the constitutional protection of religious freedom 
faces); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1351, 
1353, 1427 (2012) (explaining that the "conflict between law and morality" is that relig-
ion is special for legal reasons (in the context of U.S. constitutional law) due to its 
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amples of concrete cases that reveal this conflict of standards can be seen in 
an increasing number of legislation and regulatory steps taken in liberal 
democracies, 2 which target religious manifestations that have been labelled 
as contentious in the public discourse because of their common characteris-
tic: deviation from the dominant norms. 3 Among the examples of "high 
constitutional abilities (free exercise) and disabilities (non-establishment). However, re-
ligion is not special for normative reasons). (emphasis added). 
2. The scope of the conflict of standards is broader than simply a conflict between 
the rules of the state and competing religious norms. This conflict also covers the ten-
sion between religious beliefs and what the dominant norms of a society expect from its 
citizens: e.g. the norm of having an open dialogue and being able to communicate. The 
latter has been presented as an argument in favor of the ban on face-covering veils 
among European states. Another example is the norm of shaking hands as a sign of 
greeting, without making a distinction in gender. This norm has been used as an argu-
ment in the Netherlands to refuse an orthodox Muslim man, who refrained from shaking 
hands with women, from a job as civil servant. See Rb. Rotterdam 6 August 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2008:BD9643, ¶ 5.2.3 (Neth.). 
3. In the legal discourse, some religious manifestations have been qualified as 
contentious. See Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, App. No. 302/ 
02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), ¶ 144, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99221 ("The rites 
and rituals of many religions may harm believers' well-being, such as, for example, the 
practice of fasting, which is particularly long and strict in Orthodox Christianity, or 
circumcision practiced on Jewish or Muslim male babies. It does not appear that the 
teachings of Jehovah's Witnesses include any such contentious practices."); see also 
Sohail Wahedi, Marginaliserenvan godsdienstvrijheid oor abstraheren van de re-
ligieuze dimensie [MarginalizingReligious Freedom Through Abstractionfrom the Re-
ligious Dimension], 9 RELIGIE & SAMENLEVING [RELIGION & Soc'y] 128, 134-38 
(2014). Not all religious manifestations that are considered contentious are immediately 
abandoned. At least two recent court rulings on the legality of adopted local bans on 
religious symbols show that an appeal to state neutrality and separation of Church and 
State is not enough to justify legislation that bans publicly wearing religious symbols. 
The Belgian Raad van State, Council of State ruled in October 2014, that a local ban on 
wearing religious symbols at school that targeted Muslim veils was incompatible with 
the right to religious freedom. Raad van State Oct. 14, 2014, No. 228.752, A.209.364/ 
IX-8089, ¶ 52, http://www.raadvst-consetat.be (BeIg.). Although the Raad van State 
ruled that the outcome in this case does not imply that a ban on publicly wearing relig-
ious symbols is in general contrary to religious freedom, it held that the risk of future 
disorder, which could justify such a ban, should be substantially present and not only 
hypothetical. See Sohail Wahedi, Case no A.209.364/IX-8089, 5 O.J.L.R. 624 (2016). 
Similarly, in 2015, the majority of the Bundesverfassungsgericht,t e German Federal 
Constitutional Court, held that the North Rhine-Westphalia's ban on wearing religious 
symbols by school staff was not compatible with Germany's Basic Laws concerning 
non-discrimination and the right to freedom of faith. The Court held that an interference 
is only justified when there is proof of a concrete threat of public disorder or when the 
state's neutrality is in danger. In this case, the ban was not designed to respond to such a 
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profile" cases,4 which deal with the disputed legality of such contentious 
religious manifestations, are legal initiatives taken in some European states 
to prohibit the wearing of religious veils such as the Burqa and Niqab.5 
Concerning the widely discussed French ban on face-covering veils, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld this controversial piece 
threat and it therefore constituted a breach of Basic Laws. See Bundesverfassungsger-
icht, BvR 471/10, 1181/10 Jan. 27, 2015. See also Sohail Wahedi, BVerfG 471/10 and 
1181/10, 5 O.J.L.R. 368 (2016). 
4. Although the cases this article refers to are predominantly European, this does 
not mean that the debate on the role of religion in law and politics is exclusively a 
European matter. Canadian and United States court rulings involve many cases that can 
be seen as equivalents of the European case law on free exercise of religion. See 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U.S. (2014) (holding that the regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Health and Human Services requiring employers to provide their 
female employees with no-cost access to contraception, violated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act); see also Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding 
that "the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and 
thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use."); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the application of compulsory school-attend-
ance law interfered with other fundamental rights, such as the Free Exercise Clause 
under the First Amendment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (stating that this 
case is a prime example of what "government may not do to an individual in violation 
of his religious scruples."). Among the Canadian examples of court cases that have 
ruled on the meaning and scope of religious freedom are Mouvement laiifue Qudbicois 
& Alain Simoneau v. Saguenay [2015] S.C.R. 2 (Can.) (holding that states must not 
interfere in religion and beliefs and must remain neutral. The mayor reciting a prayer at 
the start and end of each municipal council meeting constitutes a breach of the state's 
duty of neutrality) and Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,[2006] 
S.C.R. 256 (Can.) (holding that the school board's decision of prohibiting an orthodox 
Sikh, whose religion requires him to wear a kirpan (religious object that resembles a 
dagger and must be made of metal) infringed the plaintiff's freedom of religion. "This 
infringement cannot be justified in a free and democratic society") Id. at 298. 
5. See Armin Steinbach, Burqas and Bans: The Wearing of Religious Symbols 
Under the European Convention of Human Rights, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
29 (2015); Myriam Hunter-Henin, Why the French Don't Like the Burqa: Larcit, Na-
tionalIdentity and Religious Freedom, 61 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 613 (2012); Noemi Gal-
Or, Is the Law Empowering or Patronizing Women? The Dilemma in the FrenchBurqa 
Decision as the Tip of the Secular Iceberg, 6 RELIGION & Hum. RTS. 315 (2011); 
Reuven Ziegler, The French Headscarves Ban: Intolerance or Necessity, 40 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 235 (2006); see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS 
INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE (2012); Jill 
Marshall, The Legal Recognition of Personality: Full-Face Veils and Permissible 
Choices, 10 INT'L J. OF L. IN CONTEXT 64 (2014) (criticizing the so-called Burqa bans). 
4 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24 
of legislation in S.A.S. v. France.6 The Court held that the public interest of 
living together in peace exceeds an individual's belief, which prescribes 
face-covering veils for women.7 A more recent example of adjustment to 
the dominant norms is present in Osmanoklu & Kocabaf v. Switzerland.8 In 
this case, the ECtHR held that the Swiss authorities' denial to exempt Mus-
6. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. %% 122, 137-59 (2014). 
Although in S.A.S. the ECtHR considered wearing face-covering veils constituted a 
manifestation of personal beliefs, it did not rule that the French ban was a violation of 
religious freedom. In this fiercely criticized judgment, the Court held that the lack of 
consensus among the party states, concerning the legal admissibility of wearing face-
covering veils in public, provides France with broad discretion on what types of norms 
are incompatible with basic rules of an open democracy, such as social communication 
and the idea of living together in peace. See also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of 
Appreciation and the Jurisprudenceof the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to 
the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 128 (2005) (describing the margin of 
appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR and explaining how consensus among party states 
influences the scope of the margin of appreciation party states have). 
7. The French tradition of laicitd, which requires a strict separation between relig-
ious and state matters, has made the free exercise of religion a private matter. See Eva 
Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOrINGHAM L.J. 58 (2016); Hakeem 
Yusuf, S.A.S. v France: Supporting Living Together or Forced Assimilation, 3 INT'L 
Hum. RTs. L. REV. 277 (2014); Sally Pei, Unveiling Inequality:Burqa Bans and Non-
discriminationJurisprudenceat the European Court of Human Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 
1089 (2013) (discussing the court ruling in S.A.S. v. France). 
8. Osmanoglu & Kocabaf v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2017). The public call for adjustment to the dominant norms could influence the way 
judges balance the interests at stake in a free exercise case. An example in this context 
is the way judges have responded to the legality of the religious refusal to shake hands 
as a sign of greeting. This contentious religious manifestation was debated extensively 
in the Dutch society before reaching the courtrooms. In 2004, the Dutch Minister of 
Immigration, Rita Verdonk, was denied a hand shake by an imam (the Islamic prayer 
leader). This incident resulted in a heated debate about the acceptability of such behav-
ior with reference to religious freedom. The Minister wrote in response to parliamentary 
questions that the refusal to shake hands is contrary to the Dutch standard of greeting 
everyone through shaking hands, regardless of gender. See Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal [The House of Representatives],Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary 
ProceedingsII] 2004/2005, at 1457-58 (Neth.). The reasoning judges have used in deal-
ing with cases regarding refusal to shake hands on religious grounds shows analogies 
with public opinions that have framed this practice as an act that attests to unequal 
gender-treatment. See CRvB 7 May 2009, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2009:BI2440, 11 7.6, 7.10 
(Neth.); Hof 's-Gravenhage 10 April 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSR:2012:BW1270, ¶ 13 
(Neth.); Elma Drayer, Vrome praatjes [Pious talks], de Volkskrant (Neth.), July 15, 
2015, at 2 (qualifying the convictions that shape the religious basis to refuse shaking 
hands of the opposite gender as "measly views" that immediately affect the acquired 
values within modern societies, such as gender equality). 
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lim girls from taking part in mixed-school swimming does not violate the 
right to religious freedom. The judges unanimously held that although de-
nial of the exemption request interfered with religious freedom, this inter-
ference was justified in light of the promotion of pupils' integration into 
Swiss society.9 In a similar case, a Muslim pupil had asked the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG), 
to review a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG). The BVerwG had ruled that the 
school authorities' refusal to exempt applicant from joint swimming lessons 
did not violate the right to religious freedom.' 0 The BVerfG did not accept 
the complaint for adjudication, as the petitioner failed to explain convinc-
ingly why the Burkini could not qualify as a religious alternative for other 
swimming clothes." Another typical example in this context is the ongoing 
debate in many European countries regarding the legality behind the ritual 
slaughtering of animals, such as the Halal and Kosher way of slaughter-
ing. 12 Hence, the recent court rulings are among the many examples of 
cases that have challenged the legal admissibility of contentious religious 
manifestations in liberal democracies.13 
9. See Osmanoglu & Kocabay v. Switzerland, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 95-101 (holding 
that a child's interest to assimilate into the Swiss society supersedes religious convic-
tions of parents). 
10. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, BvR 3237/13, ¶ II.3.aa, Nov. 7, 2016, http:// 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/11 /rk20 611 
08_bvr323713.html (holding that the female applicant did not adequately substantiate 
her constitutional complaint that her Burkini, which covered her whole body except for 
her face, could not be considered an adequate substitute for swimming clothes that are 
clearly disallowed by her religion). 
11. Id.; See Sohail Wahedi, BVerfG 3237/13, 6 O.J.L.R. 426 (2017). 
12. See Aleksandra Gliszczydiska-Grabias & Wojciech Sadurski, The Law of Rit-
ual Slaughterand the Principleof Religious Equality, 4 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 233, 237-
53 (2016) (outlining European approaches to the legal acceptability of ritual slaughter 
of animals); Carla M. Zoethout, Ritual Slaughter and the Freedom of Religion: Some 
Reflections on a Stunning Matter, 35 Hum. RTs. Q. 651 (2013); Markha Valenta, Plu-
ralistDemocracy or Scientistic Monocracy? Debating Ritual Slaughter, 5 ERASMUS L. 
REv. 27 (2012) (discussing the Dutch debate on this matter); Jeremy A. Rovinsky, The 
Cutting Edge: The Debate over Regulationof Ritual Slaughterin the Western World, 45 
CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 79 (2014); Claudia E. Haupt, Free Exercise ofReligion andAnimal 
Protection:A ComparativePerspective on Ritual Slaughter, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. 
REV. 839 (2007) (discussing European case law on the admissibility of ritual slaughter). 
13. With reference to either the lack of integration of migrant groups or by reli-
ance on the central values of "the society" many European politicians have started to 
dispute the legal admissibility of a wide range of religious manifestations. As such, in 
2014, -French politicians proposed a total ban on Muslim veils in universities referring 
to the principles of French secularism. The Austrian parliament passed an "Islam bill" 
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Contentious religious manifestations that compete with legal and 
majoritarian norms of liberal democracies have given rise to the question 
whether "religion" should matter when one is thinking about the creation of 
exemptions for particular beliefs and practices.1 4 Hence, the conflict of 
norms that is present in contentious religious manifestation cases opens a 
discussion about accommodation,' 5 which in this context deals with the 
to prohibit Islamic organizations from receiving foreign funding. The bill has been 
presented to be an effective tool to prevent Muslim radicalization. The Swiss referen-
dum on minarets and proposed or actual bans in various countries on ritual slaughter, 
ritual male circumcision and different types of religious dress codes are among the other 
examples of cases that have been regularly subjected to public debate. See RONALD 
DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, 145 (2013) (arguing against the Swiss minarets 
referendum using a critical-normative theory). See also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 33 
(doubting that majoritarian biases against contentious religious manifestations draw on 
a "liberal philosophicalbias in favor of belief-based and voluntarily chosen religious 
practices."). 
14. This article does not aim to provide an exhaustive description of religion. 
Rather, it aims to theorize the way liberal political philosophers have conceptualized 
religion for legal and political purposes. This approach fits C6cile Laborde's recent call 
that legal theorists and political philosophers do not need "a semantic or a descriptive 
notion of religion but, rather, an interpretive one." See LABORDE, supra note 1, at 1-3 
(arguing that although "religion" has played a very important role in the development of 
liberal political philosophy through the history, it has remained an "under-theorized" 
concept). See also Lael Daniel Weinberger, Religion Undefined: Competing 
Frameworksfor Understanding Religion in the Establishment Clause, 86 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 735 (2009) (presenting two definition frameworks for "religion" and 
discussing their relevance for the First Amendment's non-establishment clause). See 
LABORDE, supra note 1 (elaborating on the role of religion in liberal political philoso-
phy). See also Yossi Nehushtan who has rightly pointed out: "[t]he central question is 
whether the fact that religion is special in certain aspects justifies affording it a special 
weight as a reason to grant or to refuse to grant a conscientious exemption." Yossi 
Nehushtan, Religious Conscientious Exemptions, 30 L. & PHIL. 143, 149 (2011); Cf. 
Paul B. Cliteur, Tolerantieen Theoterrorisme [Toleranceand Theoterrorism], in FRANS 
KRAP & WILLEM SINNINGHE DAMSTE (EDS.), OVER TOLERANTIE GESPROKEN [SPEAK-
ING OF TOLERANCE] 157, 167-69 (2016) (criticizing the state of affairs in liberal democ-
racies by claiming that there is a "lack of tolerance." Radicalized religious people who 
use violence, are intolerant towards social plurality. As such, they do not tolerate un-
pleasant messages about their Gods and prophets. On the other hand, there is "too much 
tolerance," as liberal democracies do not take serious steps to prevent radicalization of 
certain religious groups). 
15. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Re-
sponse to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 685, 686 (1992). A quick scan of the 
scholarly debate about the "specialness of religion" informs us that liberal political phi-
losophers and legal theorists rely on legal judgments and public debates to develop 
normative arguments that re meant to answer the question what the legal definition of 
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possibility, feasibility and desirability of creating special exemptions for the 
beliefs, practices and traditions of some citizens. 16 In the liberal and non-
sectarian,' 7 meaning, non-religious theories of religious freedom,'8 the 
question of religious accommodation is put under critical scrutiny by legal 
theorists and liberal political philosophers.1 9 As such, these scholars have 
either challenged or defended the constitutional value of religion: the spe-
cial legal solicitude for religion.20 An essential part of the religious accom-
religion and religious freedom should be. Thus, the broad public debate on religious 
manifestations has an indispensable heuristic value for the scholarly debate about the 
role of religion in law and politics. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CON-
SCIENCE 348 (2008). 
16. Cf Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 603 (2006) (believing that balancing the interests, which are prima-
rily at stake when religious norms are at odds with public rules, should be related to the 
specific context of a particular case: it is not possible to provide a balancing formula). 
The best we can do is to show that we have explicitly thought about the problem of 
justice. One potential way to do so is to introduce a system that is focused on the 
question of religious exemptions. Koppelman says that due to the impossibility to "pro-
tect all deeply valuable concerns, more specific rules are necessary. Accommodation of 
religion is one of these." Id. 
17. The term "sectarian" has a functional meaning in the literature on the role of 
religion in law and politics. It conceptualizes theories using religious arguments (secta-
rian) to justify the special legal solicitude towards religion. 
18. Generally, sectarian theories of religious freedom justify the legal protection 
of free exercise with an appeal to the distinct value of religion. See Michael W. McCon-
nell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sue. CT. REv. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing that the 
liberal state is not able to exclude ultimately the possibility that religious claims might 
be true, which means that the transcendental authority of such claims has more value 
than the claims of the state). McConnell states the following: 
If there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends the authority of nations .... 
For the state to maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would be to 
deny the possibility that a [transcendent] authority could exist. Religious claims 
thus differ from secular moral claims both because the state is constitutionally 
disabled from disputing the truth of the religious claim and because it cannot cate-
gorically deny the authority on which such a claim rests. 
McConnell continued to defend this line in recent publications. See generally, Michael 
W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 786-89 (2013); 
Cf also Rafael Domingo, A New Global Paradigmfor Religious Freedom, 56 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 427, 432 (2014) (defending a similar argument); see also Lund, supra 
note 1, at 490 (providing an overview of and discussing some of the religious arguments 
in favor of religious freedom). 
19. See generally CECILE LABORDE & AUR LIA BARDON, RELIGION IN LIBERAL 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017). 
20. See C6cile Laborde, Religion in the Law: The DisaggregationApproach, 34 
LAW & PHIL. 581 (2015), for the theoretical distinction between sectarian and liberal 
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modation debate has been marked by the following two questions: 
accommodation for whom and for what reasons?2 1 These are the two-al-
though roughly formulated-questions legal theorists and liberal political 
philosophers focus on to reflect on the normative foundations of toleration 
for and protection of religious beliefs and practices in liberal democracies. 22 
This article argues that the scholarly debate in legal theory and liberal 
political philosophy about he role of religion in law and politics has been 
dominated by the following normative question: should liberal democracies 
care about religion qua religion for the public justification of decisions 
taken in law and politics? 23 This article consists of three substantive parts 
and it focuses on the question whether the law in liberal democracies should 
care about religion qua religion. In other words: does religion qua religion 
deserve special legal protection? 
To answer this question, Part I develops a conceptual framework of 
normative positions, each theorizing a particular approach to religion in law 
and religious claims for exemptions from general laws. 24 This Part elabo-
theories of religious freedom. Cf. Nehushtan, supra note 14, at 145-50. Nehushtan, 
whose work is concerned with the liberal discussion of granting exemptions, speaks of 
functionalist pro-religious approaches to deal with religious claims for exemptions from 
general laws. See also Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 
47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 993, 996 (2010) (introducing and discussing the right to moral 
freedom as an extended version of the rights to religious freedom and arguing that this 
broadening is justified in light of the ecumenical and non-sectarian account of moral 
freedom). 
21. These two questions are helpful to deal in a more systematic way with the 
controversies that arise out of free exercise. Brian Leiter compares an orthodox Sikh 
boy to a Sikh boy from a traditional family. Both want to wear a dagger: the orthodox 
Sikh boy for religious purposes (he wants to wear a kirpan, a religious object made of 
metal that resembles a dagger) and the other boy for reasons of tradition. BRIAN LEITER, 
WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 1 (2013). This case questions what the justification would 
be to treat the two differently. That is to say, Leiter asks, "[w]hy the state should have 
to tolerate exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with religious 
obligations but not with any other equally serious obligations of conscience." Id. at 3. 
22. See Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equalityand Anarchy, in CECILE LABORDE 
& AURtLIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2017) 
(arguing that the current debate in liberal political philosophy about the role of religion 
in law and politics consists of two more specific debates on the role of religion for the 
purpose of state actions (public justification debate) and its relevance for granting ex-
emptions (the religious accommodation debate) to certain groups in society). 
23. See id. 
24. The concepts introduced and discussed in Part I stand for different theoretical 
frameworks present in the liberal theories of religious freedom that include arguments 
concerning the way liberal democracies could deal with religion in law and religious 
claims for exemptions from laws. This way of conceptualizing extant liberal approaches 
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rates on the body of arguments that has been developed by scholars in legal 
theory and liberal political philosophy, to discuss the special legal solicitude 
for religion. These influential liberal approaches are classified into rejec-
tion; substitution; generalization; equation and representation.This classi-
fication of extant liberal theories might look "oversimplified," but it is a 
useful method to bring positions that use similar arguments under the same 
category. 25 
Part II draws on the framework of normative positions to answer the 
question whether religion qua religion deserves special protection in law. 
This Part provides a threefold answer to this question. First, it provides an 
overview of the arguments that suggest why religion definitely does not 
require special legal protection qua religion. Second, it provides insight into 
the arguments used to claim that religion does not necessarily require spe-
cial legal protection. Third, it draws attention to some arguments that ex-
plain why religion qua religion deserves special protection. This threefold 
response is used to introduce the synthesis of the normative positions that 
are conceptualized in this article. This synthesis is called abstractionfrom. 
the religious dimension. 
The synthesis of the normative positions is further disentangled in Part 
IHl, which claims that abstraction from the religious dimension is the bind-
ing characteristic of the normative framework developed in this article. This 
Part explains how abstraction dismisses the special legal protection of relig-
ion qua religion and argues that abstraction renounces arguments justifying 
religious freedom with an appeal to distinctly religious values. In addition, 
it explains how abstraction draws on a general framework of values to jus-
tify free exercise. The main argument of this Part is that abstraction stands 
for a non-sectarian and religion-empty understanding of religious freedom: 
free from distinctly religious values, though not hostile to religion.26 
towards the role religion could have for legal and political purposes elaborates on C& 
cile Laborde's discussion of the substitutionand proxy approaches.See Laborde, supra 
note 20, at 583. 
25. See Schwartzman, supra note 22 at 16 (explaining how the development of a 
general theory about the role of religion for legal and political purposes helps to identify 
the inconsistencies that are present in both, public justification theories and religious 
accommodation theories). See also Smith, supranote, I at 1568 (criticizing the wave of 
generalization in the scholarly debate about religious freedom). 
26. Although the main purpose of this article is to introduce abstraction without 
having a normative judgment about this binding feature of the liberal theories of relig-
ious freedom, the framework of argumentation patterns provides an appropriate base to 
reflect critically on the contemporary direction of the law and religion debate in legal 
theory and liberal political philosophy. See Michael W. McConnell, Why ProtectRelig-
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The main conclusion of this article is that the liberal theories of relig-
ious freedom have one important commonality: abstractionfrom the relig-
ious dimension. The central message of this shared feature is that for the 
legal analysis of religious freedom or a clear case of religious manifesta-
tion, it is not possible, nor necessary to describe or understand the case at 
stake in distinctly religious terms. Thus, abstraction covers and connects 
arguments that oppose to justify the special legal protection of religious 
freedom, religious beliefs and practices in light of any presumed religious 
value. The argument is that liberal theories of religious freedom do not need 
to value, understand or engage in a semantic discussion about "religion" to 
talk about religious freedom. Abstraction also covers the normative re-
sponse to the question: should the law in a liberal democracy care about 
religion, because it is religion? Allegedly, religious toleration should not 
take place due to any distinctly religious value. Rather, a broader and less 
specific (meaning in this context sectarian) framework of values should be 
used to justify and explain free exercise of religion in liberal democracies. 27 
I. THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND RELIGION 
What do current debates in legal theory and liberal political philosophy 
tell us about the way modem liberal democracies interpret, value, protect 
and thus deal with religious freedom? To answer this question, we must 
focus on a broad set of religious freedom theories. The main distinction that 
has been made in the literature on the role of religion for granting exemp-
tions and justifying decisions in law and politics concerns the one between 
ious Freedom?, 10 CHRISTIAN L. 15 (2014) (warning of the "new whiff of intolerance" 
towards religious freedom as a "bedrock value" of constitutional democracies). 
27. The main research method of this article is a conceptual meta-analysis of posi-
tions defended in the "specialness-debate" of religion, with a particular focus on the 
liberal theories of religious freedom. To identify the binding characteristic of the nor-
mative positions, this article has developed a matrix of positions. This matrix focuses on 
the arguments developed to deal with the question whether religion qua religion needs 
special legal protection. Based on the commonalities between the arguments present in 
the liberal theories of religious freedom, the approaches are conceptualized and classi-
fied as rejection;substitution;generalization;equation and representation.This classi-
fication of positions is an appropriate method to develop a normative legal-
philosophical framework that theorizes the main claim of this article: abstractionfrom 
the religious dimension as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of religious 
freedom. See also Schwartzman, supra note 22, at 28 (explaining how building up a 
theory in a systematic way sharpens our mind to see the inconsistencies in the existing 
body of knowledge). 
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liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom. 2 8 As such, sectarian the-
ories justify the special legal solicitude towards religion with an appeal to 
some values that are presented as distinctly religious, 29 although this privi-
lege is usually limited to some officially recognized religions. 30 This Part 
28. See LABORDE & BARDON, supranote 19, at 2-4 (explaining that the discussion 
about religion in law is a sub-theme of the broader debate among liberal political phi-
losophers and legal theorists about the relationship between religion and the liberal 
state); Schwartzman, supra note 22, at 15. See also Laborde, supra note 20, at 582 
(explaining the distinction between liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom 
and arguing that the transcendental value of religion does not justify religious freedom). 
The paradigmatic distinction between sectarian and liberal theories of religious freedom 
is present within the paradigm of "religion" in liberal political philosophy. Therefore, 
there are non-liberal, non-sectarian theories of religious freedom, such as communist 
theories. See Paul B. Anderson, Religious Liberty under Communism, 6 J. CHURCH & 
ST. 169 (1964). Also, there are hybrid theories of religious freedom, using a mixture of 
liberal and sectarian arguments to justify religious freedom and the legality of certair 
religious manifestation. Cf the Israeli approach to religious freedom. See Donna E. 
Arzt, Religious Freedom in a Religious State: The Case of Israel in Comparative Con-
stitutionalPerspective, 9 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 (1990). 
29. DAVID NOVAK, IN DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 116, 117 (2009) (using a 
transcendental argument to justify the special legal protection of religion). See also 
RAFAEL DOMINGO, GOD AND THE SECULAR LEGAL SYSTEM 79, 80-82 (2016) (consider-
ing the "protection of suprarationality" as the "ultimate justification" for protecting re-
ligion qua religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of 
Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 1159, 1183 (2013); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE 
FREEDOMs FOR? 57 (1996) (claiming that within the context of U.S. constitutional law, 
the "split-level character" could only be clarified in light of an exclusive "religious 
justification" of religious freedom). 
30. Cf The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that contains a sectarian 
explanation of "religious freedom." Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution exhaustively 
enumerate religions that are allowed to practice their faiths within the legal framework 
of the Islamic Republic. The "recognized" religions include Zoroastrianism, Judaism 
and Christianity. The Shia Jafari school of beliefs is the "eternally immutable" state's 
religion. See QANUNI AsSASSI JUMHURIT ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IS-
LAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (1980) (IRAN), http://www.divan-edalat.ir/show.php?page= 
base, (translation) (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) http://www.alaviandassociates.com/docu 
ments/constitution.pdf. Sectarian theories of religious freedom are also advocated 
outside theocracies. The Dutch orthodox Christian political party, Staatkundig Ger-
eformeerde Partij [The Dutch Reformed PoliticalParty] ("SGP") recently argued for a 
sectarian explanation of religious freedom. In their manifest, the SGP defends the argu-
ment that the state should make a distinction between religions that have shaped the 
Dutch tradition (including Christianity and Judaism and excluding Islam), to preserve 
the Judeo-Christian character of the Dutch culture and society. SGP, Islam in Nederland 
[Islam in the Netherlands] 3, 4 (2017), https://www.sgp.nl/actueel/manifest-islam-in 
nederland/6125 (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
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develops a conceptual framework of normative approaches to religion in 
law. 3 1 This framework classifies the liberal positions into five categories. 
First, principled rejection of arguments that justify the special legal protec-
tion of religion with an appeal to values that are presented as distinctly 
religious. Rejection also involves arguments that reject to qualify specific 
beliefs or manifestations as religious. Second, substitution that consists of 
arguments explaining why religion is a subset of a broader human faculty, 
namely conscience. Substitution also covers arguments that say religious 
freedom has no distinct constitutional value, as other liberties, such as the 
freedom of expression and association in combination with the right to non-
discrimination, in practice could guarantee free exercise of religion. Third, 
generalization that opposes a sectarian interpretation of religion and relig-
ious freedom, arguing that religion stands for deep ethical commitments of 
human beings and that religious freedom is the general right that gives 
human beings access to ethical independence and moral freedom. Fourth, 
equation, which says that equality of treatment should be the norm when 
authorities are dealing with deep commitments of human beings who ask 
for exemptions from the application of general laws. Fifth, representation, 
which justifies the special legal protection of religion in light of values that 
are not necessarily religious in nature. Religion represents in this position 
certain values that let human beings flourish and this particular argument 
justifies the special legal protection of religion.32 
A. Rejection 
The rejectionist position rejects arguments that justify religious free-
dom with an appeal to values that are considered distinctly religious. This 
position consists of two broader categories: principled rejection and non-
principledrejection. Non-principled rejection claims that the concept of re-
ligion does not apply to certain beliefs, traditions or manifestations. 33 How-
ever, non-principled rejection does not exclude the option to use the term 
"religion" to consider other manifestations as religious for reasons of con-
31. The term "principled" used to discuss the sub-categories of rejection and sub-
stitution does not refer to Ronald Dworkin's principles. Rather, the term is meant to 
indicate that the principledsub-categories provide a deeper philosophical justification 
for the argumentation pattern they defend. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 13. 
32. The focus is on the appropriate interpretation of "the notion of religion in law 
(regardless of whether the category of freedom of religion is upheld or not)." Laborde, 
supra note 20, at 594. 
33. See generally Amos N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 19 (2009); Wibren 
van der Burg, Beliefs, Personsand Practices:Beyond Tolerance, 1 ETHICAL THEORY & 
MORAL PRAC. 227, 233 (1998) (using a similar typology to discuss religious toleration). 
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sensus and tradition. Thus, it preserves the term "religion" for particular 
religions and excludes other religions, as those do not fall under the specific 
definition of "religion." The appropriate example is the rhetorical approach 
that is present in the political discourse to consider Islam not a religion, but 
rather a totalitarian ideology with a closed internal system of rules that pre-
scribe in detail how one should live a life. Against this backdrop, it has 
been argued that practices and beliefs that are based on Islam should not 
have access to the privileges of religious freedom. 34 Principled rejection 
draws primarily on the idea that there are no reasons, which could be con-
sidered principled, to tolerate religion qua religion within liberal 
democracies." 
1. Principled Rejection 
The principled rejectionist position rejects, for principled reasons, to 
tolerate religion qua religion. This position starts from the question what 
the philosophical notion of pure toleration (i.e. toleration on principled, 
grounds) says about the justification of the special legal protection of relig-
ion qua religion. Thus, it wonders whether the concept of toleration pro-
vides any room for arguments that justify religious toleration because of 
any specialness of religion (i.e. distinctly religious values). This sub-posi-
tion defines pure toleration as the situation in which the dominant group 
sees on moral or epistemic grounds a reason to allow (meaning tolerate on 
principled grounds) another group of citizens to continue with manifesta-
tions that are considered objectionable by the dominant group. Principled 
rejection draws on this particular definition of toleration and concludes that 
the principle of toleration does not require special legal protection for relig-
ion qua religion.3 6 
34. See infra Part II. 
35. LEITER, supra note 21, at 7, 55, 67; see also Schwartzman, supra note 22, at 
22; Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special Right to Religion 
Wrongly DiscriminatesagainstNon-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 217 
(2017); C6cile Laborde, Conclusion: Is Religion Special?, in JEAN LOUISE COHEN & 
CECILE LABORDE (EDS.), RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
423 (2016); DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 111, 144; NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 164; 
WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 138 
(2005); James Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLo. L. REV. 941, 943 
(2005); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The ConstitutionalBasisfor ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1245, 1248 (1994). 
36. Toleration can be justified on two grounds: moral or epistemic grounds. Brian 
Leiter concludes that there is nothing special, in terms of morality or epistemology, to 
warrant toleration of religion qua religion. LEITER, supra note 21, at 7-13; see LORENZO 
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The principled rejectionist questions whether one can identify more 
principled reasons, i.e. reasons that find their origins in morality or episte-
mology that could justify a toleration regime for religion qua religion. To 
answer this question, the principled rejectionist position makes a distinction 
between two potentially distinctive characteristics of religion: "the cat-
egoricity of religious commands" and "insulation of religious beliefs from 
evidence and reason."3 7 This particular feature is closely related to the argu-
ment that religious beliefs might be distinctive, due to their involvement in 
a "metaphysics of ultimate reality." 38 
a. No moral grounds to tolerate religion qua religion 
According to the principled rejectionist position, the moral reasons for 
toleration only justify the special legal protection of human conscience. 
This moral justification of liberty of conscience does not simultaneously 
single out religion and its categoricity of commands for special legal protec-
tion. Thus, no evidence could support the argument that people in the Rawl-
sian "original position" will opt for religious freedom, next to equal liberty 
of conscience. 39 Hence, the emphasis on the need for liberty of conscience 
does not make a distinction between the backgrounds of conscientious com-
mands: it does not single out religion.40 Leiter explains this argument as 
follows: "Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity to-
gether, so that it is fair to say that the only thing individuals behind the veil 
of ignorance know is that they will accept some categorical demands, not 
they will accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose grounding 
is a matter of faith." 4 1 Similarly, the utilitarian moral arguments for tolera-
ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE: LAw AND RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LANDSCAPE 8, n. 17 (2012) (providing a broader definition of toleration). 
37. LEITER, supra note 21, at 33-34. 
38. Id. at 47. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168. 
39. Rawlsian morality arguments in favor of toleration states that people in the 
original position, when they perform behind the "veil of ignorance," will definitely 
accept some categorical demands, though these are not of a religious nature per se. In 
other words, this ground of toleration does not provide a principled argument o tolerate 
"religion qua religion." See generally LEITER, supra note 21, at 55. 
40. See Simon Cibulea May, Exemptions for Conscience, in CECILE LABORDE & 
AURALIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (2017) (ar-
guing that accommodation of sincere conscientious objections to generally applicable 
laws face the same criticism of unfair treatment as religious accommodation does). 
41. LEITER, supra note 21, at 55; See Andrew Koppelman, A Rawlsian Defence of 
Special Treatmentfor Religion, in CECILE LABORDE & AUR LIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIG-
ION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (2017) (presenting some Rawlsian argu-
ments in defense of religious freedom). 
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tion, which focus on the maximization of human well-being that, among 
others, depends on the ability of people to live by their conscience, do not 
prescribe special protection of religion. Therefore, toleration on moral 
grounds does not support the arguments that aim to single out religion as a 
matter of principled toleration.4 2 
b. No epistemic grounds to tolerate religion qua religion 
The other principled ground for toleration that has been found in the 
epistemic, Millian arguments, draws on the relevance of principled tolera-
tion for knowledge expansion. This principled ground seems to be at odds 
with the second potentially distinctive feature of religion: insulation of re-
43ligious beliefs from evidence and reason. As Leiter argues, it is far from 
obvious "to think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are 
insulated from evidence and reasons-that is, insulated from epistemically 
relevant considerations-will promote knowledge of the truth." 4 4 Although 
this argument does not say anything about the relevance of religious mani-
festations for knowledge expansion, it is conceivable to say that principled 
rejection equally rejects arguments that aim to justify on epistemic grounds 
toleration for religious conduct, because of religion. The argument at this 
point is that, after all, there is no reason to deny that religious practices are, 
like religious beliefs, equally insulated from evidence. 
c. Conclusion 
The principled rejectionist position claims that there are no principled 
reasons (i.e. reasons that are grounded in morality or epistemology) to toler-
ate religion in law qua religion.45 Principled toleration only requires equal 
protection of liberty of conscience and it does not require, on the same 
principled grounds, the special protection of religion. Toleration of con-
science via liberty of conscience also provides protection to religious con-
42. LEITER, supra note 21, at 55, 61. 
43. Leiter argues that reliance on Mill's perspective on what is "true for the right 
reasons" will not make a strong case to tolerate religion qua religion for epistemic 
reasons; religious faith excludes the idea that there might be some uncovered truth. Id. 
at 58. 
44. Id. at 55-56. 
45. See also Kimberley Brownlee, Is Religious Conviction Special?, in CECILE 
LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
309 (2017) (arguing that religious convictions cannot be singled out for special legal 
treatment on moral or epistemic grounds and that religious and non-religious moral 
convictions that are protection-worthy should receive the same amount of protection, if 
they meet certain conditions). 
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science. There is no principledreason to make a legal distinction between 
human conscience in generaland religious conscience in particular.46 This 
position results in the conclusion that a distinct protection of religious 
claims of conscience is undesirable for principled reasons. Thus, no moral 
reason could justify a legal regime that only grants exemptions to religious 
claims of conscience. As Leiter says: "a selective application to the con-
science of only religious believers is not morally defensible." 4 7 
2. Non-Principled Rejection 
Non-principled rejection rejects the qualification of certain beliefs, 
speeches or conducts as religious and it is mainly present in the political 
and legal discourse. As such, one can refer to the political approach of the 
Dutch right-wing party, Partif voor de Vrijheid, the Party for Freedom, to-
wards Islam.4 8 This political party has repeatedly argued that Islam is not a 
religion, but a totalitarian ideology that should not have access to the privi-
leges of religious freedom. 4 9 Consequently, it has proposed an immigration 
ban from Islamic countries, the legal prohibition of the Koran and the clo-
sure of all mosques and Islamic schools in the Netherlands.5 o Non-princi-
pled rejection in the legal discourse occurs when someone asks for 
permission to perform a practice that is portrayed as religious but not appar-
ently allowed by authorities. In some of these cases that deal with the legal 
admissibility of norm-deviant practices, the court or other parties involved, 
refuse to say that the practice at stake has, at least potentially, a religious 
dimension. 
As such, the Dutch Nijmegen municipality did not allow a Pastafarian 
female, a follower of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, to keep a 
pasta strainer on her head for her driver's license photograph.51 According 
to the authorities, this Church does not belong to any religion.52 It is rather a 
parody of religion and its manifestations are expressions of the freedom of 
speech.53 Among other examples of Dutch court cases that contain argu-
46. Religion is a subset of the human conscience. Therefore, its free exercise 
should be protected through liberty of conscience. 
47. LEITER, supra note 21, at 133. See also Himma, supra note 35, at 219. 
48. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives], Aan-




51. Rb. Gelderland 17 January 2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:275, ¶ 6 (Neth.). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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ments that fall under the scope of non-principled rejection, one could refer 
to tax exemption litigations of the Scientology Church 54 and the Church of 
55 Satan case. 
B. Subsitution 
The substitution position claims that both religion and religious free-
dom have adequate substitutes. 56 As the rejectionist position, substitution 
consists of principled substitution and non-principled substitution. 57 The 
sub-category of principled substitution draws on arguments that say religion 
is a subset of a particular faculty that is worthy of special legal protection. 
This protection-worthy faculty concerns human conscience. 8 The argument 
is that free exercise of religion and the admissibility of religious claims for 
exemptions could be adequately ensured via freedom of conscience. 59 Non-
principled substitution says that basic liberties, such as the right to free 
54. Hof. Den Haag 21 October 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:2875, [ 8.16 (hold-
ing that the activities of the Scientology Church-in particular, Auditing and Train-
ing-are commercial in nature and not religious, serving primarily private interests. 
Thus, the Church is being ineligible for tax exemptions). 
55. The case of Saint-Walburga, which focused on sisters forming the Church of 
Satan, turned on the question whether a brothel could be considered a religious institu-
tion. HR 31 October 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9553 (Neth.); Cf Religion Based on 
Sex Gets a Judicial Review, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/us/re-
ligion-based-on-sex-gets-a-judicial-review.html (last visited March 3, 2018) (discussing 
a case in which a couple charged for pimping and prostitution claimed that the activities 
that took place in the Church were part of their sacred religion). 
56. See generally Laborde, supra note 1; Michah Schwartzman, Religion as a Le-
gal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2014) (discussing the "substitution" 
position). 
57. The philosophical grounding for principled substitution clarifies the distinc-
tion: see supra note 31 (explaining the relevance of the terms principled v. non-princi-
pled in the conceptual framework this article has developed). 
58. This article will not engage in the discussion about the different conceptions of 
conscience, nor will it discuss the argument that there is a difference between human 
conscience and religious conscience. See Lund, supra note 1, at 503, 504. For the argu-
ment that this article aims to develop, it is sufficient to indicate that some liberal theo-
rists of religious freedom argue that religion and religious freedom have certain 
substitutes. 
59. See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (arguing that given "the context of contemporary societies 
marked by moral and religious diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves 
that must enjoy a special status but rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to 
structure their moral identity."). See also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 66, 67 (critical of 
the position defended by Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor). 
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speech and the freedom of association, in conjunction with non-discrimina-
tion and some security rights, such as the general ban on rape and murder, 
are in practice enough to guarantee the free exercise of religion. Thus, as 
Nickel has rightly asked: "who needs freedom of religion," when this right 
turns out to be superfluous? 60 
1. Principled Subsitution 
Principled substitution says that religion is a subset of a broader pro-
tection-worthy category, the conscience. 61 With reference to the work of 
Roger Williams, Nussbaum argues: 
The faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate 
meaning of life is of intrinsic worth and value, and is worthy of re-
spect whether the person is using it well or badly. The faculty is iden-
tified in part by what it does-it reasons, searches, and experiences 
emotions of longing connected to that search-and in part by its sub-
ject matter-it deals with ultimate questions, questions of ultimate 
meaning. It is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of political 
respect, and thus we can agree to respect the faculty without prejudic-
ing the question whether there is a meaning to be found, or what it 
might be like. From the respect we have for the person's conscience, 
that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we ought to 
respect the space required by any activity that has the general shape 
of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except when that search 
violates the right of others or comes up against some compelling state 
interest.62 
According to Nussbaum, this way of reasoning helps us "to make 
sense of our feeling that there really is something about religion or quasi-
religion that calls for special protection and delicacy." 63 And this protec-
60. Nickel, supra note 35, at 943. 
61. See also Koppelman, supra note 41, at 38 (rejecting the claim that religion is a 
subset of human conscience and arguing that the latter "is at best a complement, not a 
substitute, for teleologically loaded terms such as religion."). 
62. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168-69. Nussbaum's conception of religion as a 
protection-worthy sub-category of human conscience fits her work developing a univer-
sally applicable framework for social justice. Nussbaum's normative framework-
which is closely linked to political liberalism-elaborates on Aristotelian Essentialism 
and focuses on identifying the main characteristics of a human life. See Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Human Functioningand Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essen-
tialism, 30 POL. THEORY 202 (1992). 
63. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 169 (arguing that the search for meaningful 
answers to ultimate questions of life helps us to keep our special solicitude for religion, 
as a matter of respect for a broader human faculty, separated from "silly" faculties. That 
19 2017-2018] Abstractionfrom the Religious Dimension 
tion-worthy "something" is the human conscience, which is part of the ina-
lienable dignity people possess, regardless of their educational background, 
the state of richness, health, religiosity and so on.64 Thus, no principled 
reason to single out religion because it is religion, but a principled argument 
to justify the special protection of a broad liberty of conscience that encom-
passes and protects the religious conscience as a matter of respect for 
human dignity. 6 5 Therefore, the reason as to why religious claims for ex-
emptions are sometimes granted is "because they involve matters of con-
science, not matters of religion." 66 
2. Non-Principled Subsitution 
The purport of non-principled substitution is that the right application 
of the existing framework of basic liberties, such as the freedom of speech 
and association, in combination with rights that prohibit discrimination and 
violence, makes a separate right to religious freedom fairly unnecessary. 67 
In other words: freedom of religion has, not to say many, but at least some 
very "adequate substitute[s]." 68 Arguments that support the replacement of 
religious freedom consider this right "dispensable," 69 as other basic liberties 
ensure the free exercise of religion. The argument suggests that religious 
manifestations in the core cover a broad range of areas people are involved 
in, such as business, politics and association. Hence, free exercise of relig-
ion could be seen as a derivate of other basic liberties. Non-principled sub-
stitution understands religious freedom in light of the argument "that the 
sorts of activities it involves are covered by the most important general 
liberties." 70 However, the argument that says "we can adequately enumerate 
is to say, "faculties used by my car lover, who isn't engaged in a search for meaning, or 
the person who feels called to dress like a chicken when going to work, which is (proba-
bly) just too silly to count as a genuine search for meaning."). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 164-74; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 61-66; Cf LEITER, supra 
note 21 (discussing the line that liberty of conscience is an appropriate substitute for 
religious freedom). In the theoretical framework that Leiter uses to develop his argu-
ment, principled substitution arises out of what the liberal concept of toleration consid-
ers protection-worthy for principled reasons: equal liberty of conscience. 
66. LEITER, supra note 21, at 64. 
67. See Nickel, supra note 35, for a further discussion of this position; see also 
Mark Tushnet, Redundant of FreeExercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Cm. L. J. 71, 73, 94 
(2001). 
68. Tushnet, supra note 67, at 94. 
69. Nickel, supra note 35, at 941. 
70. Id. at 950. 
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the basic liberties without referring to religion" 7' and that this will ensure 
the free exercise of religion, has consequences for the question as to how 
we should understand religious freedom. 
As such, non-principled substitution expects that he idea that religious 
freedom rests on the same basics like other basic liberties will gain ground. 
Thus, there is no reason to think that religion is something unique that could 
justify the protection of religion qua religion. Also, the expectation is that 
understanding the need for the free exercise of religion in light of the ex-
isting set of basic liberties could help to eliminate the idea that religious 
beliefs are privileged in society. Therefore, the granted exemptions are the 
outcome of a right application of basic liberties and not due to the presumed 
distinct value of religious beliefs. Finally, the emphasis on the protection of 
religious beliefs via the application of basic liberties ensures that people 
have a real choice to engage in or disapprove certain convictions. 72 
C. Generalization 
Generalization advocates a broader,ecumenical and non-sectarian def-
inition of religion and religious freedom. Against this normative backdrop, 
it defends the position that religious freedom should not be considered a 
special right-such as the right to freedom of speech-protecting only a 
selected group of people: the believers, but rather a general right to ethical 
and moral independence. 73 This position is ecumenical for the reason that it 
looks beyond the sectarian, meaning theistic account of religion and it is 
non-sectarian for the reason that it does not make a distinction between 
theistic and non-theistic convictions about the good. 74 
Generalization looks for reasons of liberal neutrality beyond the nar-
row, theistic conception of "religion." The argument is that God-believers 
and non-believers could be seen as "religious," as both could have the same 
deep feelings about fundamental questions.75 The generalist position sees in 
the deep commitment that religious and non-religious people share an "in-
trinsic and inescapable ethical responsibility" to succeed in life.7 6 Therefore, 
71. Id. at 943. 
72. Id. at 943-51. 
73. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 132 (discussing religious freedom as a general 
right to ethical independence); see also Perry, supranote 20, at 996 (stating how broad-
ening religious freedom will encompass moral freedom). 
74. Perry, supra note 20, at 996; see Roland Pierik & Wibren van der Burg, What 
is Neutrality?, 27 RATIO JURIs 496, 507 (2014). 
75. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 5. 
76. Id. at 114. I am grateful to M. Christian Green who came up with the sugges-
tion to look at Paul Tillich's idea of "ultimate concerns" used by scholars to interpret 
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this position says that religious freedom should be considered the general 
right to ethical independence that opens the doors to moral freedom. Dwor-
kin states: 
Ethical independence, that is, stops government from restricting 
freedom only for certain reasons and not for others. Special rights, on 
the other hand, place much more powerful and general constraints on 
government. Freedom of speech is a special right: government may 
not infringe that special freedom unless it has what American lawyers 
have come to call a "compelling" justification. Speakers may not be 
censored even when what they say may well have bad consequences 
for other people: because they campaign for forest despoliation or 
because it would be expensive to protect them from an outraged 
crowd. The right to free speech can be abridged only in 
emergencies. . .. 
The generalist position considers religious freedom the right that gives 
human beings full access to ethical independence. Thus, the generalist ac-
count of religious freedom emphasises the opportunities people have to 
make independent decisions about how to live their lives by their deeply, 
held ethical commitments. This approach apparently extends the definition 
of religion. 78 The main justification for this extension is rooted in the idea 
that we need a deeper (meaning non-sectarian) understanding of religious 
freedom since the free exercise of religion cannot be protected on sectarian 
grounds, for distinctly religious reasons. 79 The leading normative argument 
behind generalization and its emphasis on rethinking religious beliefs as 
religion beyond its theistic definition. See James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Su-
preme Court: Tillich's Ultimate Concern as a Standardin JudicialInterpretation,30 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 245, 260 (1988) (discussing this development). 
77. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 131. 
78. The advocated extension of the definition of "religion," as defended by the 
generalist school of thought, falls under the so-called "inclusive non-accommodation" 
theories of religious freedom. The "inclusiveness" is related to the public justification 
debate, implying that "religion" is not something special for the justification of legal 
and political decisions. Thus, no limitation on the addition of "religion" to the body of 
categories that can be used by legal and political authorities to justify their decisions. 
Similarly, "religion" is not special for the accommodation question: religions and non-
religions should be treated equally by granting exemptions. See Schwartzman, supra 
note 22, at 22. A serious concern of this "symmetrical theory" of religious freedom-on 
both sides (public justification and religious accommodation) religion is not something 
special-is the huge risk of anarchy. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 117; 
LEITER, supra note 21, at 94; NusSBAUM, supra note 15, at 173 (drawing attention to 
the side-constraints of an all-inclusive term religion). 
79. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 17, 129. See also Matthew Clayton, Is Ethical 
Independence Enough?, in CECILE LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN 
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deep ethical commitments, and religious freedom as a general right to moral 
and ethical independence, is the assumption that public authorities are not 
in the position, nor able, to judge what should count as moral or religious 
truth. Perry says the following: 
[government], including a political majority, is not to be trusted 
as an arbiter of moral truth-when no legitimate government interest 
is at stake; moreover, the coercive imposition of moral uniformity, 
when no legitimate government interest is at stake, is more likely to 
corrode than to nurture the strength of a democracy. Religious believ-
ers do not have less reason than nonbelievers-instead, religious be-
lievers and nonbelievers have the same basic reason-to insist that 
government not ban or otherwise regulate or impede a moral 
practice.80 
Ethical independence is presented as a normative value of the political 
liberty paradigm. Hence, it restricts authorities' opportunities to disfavor a 
particular view on what deserves attention in life. Dworkin states: 
In a state that prizes freedom, it must be left to individual citi-
zens, one by one, to decide such questions for themselves, not up to 
government to impose one view on everyone. So, government may 
not forbid drug use just because it deems drug use shameful, for ex-
ample; it may not forbid logging just because it thinks that people 
who do not value great forests are despicable; it may not levy highly 
progressive taxes just because it thinks that materialism is evil. But of 
course, ethical independence does not prevent government from in-
terfering with people's chosen ways of life for other reasons: to pro-
tect other people from harm.8s 
Thus, understanding religion in terms of access to ethical indepen-
dence pursues an ideal of liberal neutrality, 82 towards what Nussbaum has 
called, the "ultimate questions" of life. 83 The call for liberal neutrality to-
wards deep human commitments has been strengthened by the claim that 
ethical independence in the core "requires that government not restrict citi-
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 132 (2017) (a recent defense of Dworkin's approach to 
religious freedom). 
80. Perry, supra note 20, at 1012. This concerns a Lockean criticism on govern-
mental interference in matters of morality and religion. Locke states that the main pur-
pose of the law "is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and 
security of the commonwealth and of every particular man's goods and person." Id. at 
1003. 
81. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 130. 
82. Cicile Laborde, Dworkin's Freedom of Religion Without God, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 125, 1258 (2014). 
83. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168. 
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zens' freedom when its justification assumes that one conception of how to 
live, of what makes a successful life, is superior to others. It is often an 
interpretive question, and sometimes a difficult one, whether a policy does 
reflect that assumption." 84 
To clarify why we should endorse liberal neutrality as a matter of prin-
ciple, the generalist position divides basic liberties into special and general 
rights. The difference between these two variants is rooted in the threshold 
authorities have to step over when they aim to restrict a right. Special rights 
focus on the "subject matter" and it is complicated to limit these rights 
legitimately, except in cases of emergency. The focus of a general right is 
on the relation between authorities and people. General rights restrict the 
scope of arguments authorities can provide to legitimately limit the exercise 
of a general right.85 
The specific distinction between general (restrict arguments to limit 
free exercise) and special (focus is on a protection-worthy subject) rights 
gives generalists a reason to argue that religious freedom should be seen a 
general right as the category of "religion" remains a complicated subject to 
interpret. Thus, the definition problem of religion that according to the 
generalist position is intertwined with freedom of religion is an important 
argument to oppose granting religious freedom a special status, or consider-
ing religious freedom a special right. The semantic criticism at this point 
states that a special right would explicitly focus on the definition of religion 
and it would not be able to solve the definition problem of this right.8 6 Also, 
a special right requires high demands on restrictions that aim to limit the 
exercise of such a right. 
Instead, the generalist position argues that approaching religious free-
dom as a general right to ethical independence will provide protection to the 
free exercise of religion. The generalist position explains that the right to 
ethical independence "condemns any explicit discrimination . . . that as-
sumes . . . that one variety of religious faith is superior to others in truth or 
virtue or that a political majority is entitled to favor one faith over others or 
84. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 141-42; see also Pierik & Van der Burg, supra 
note 74, at 507 (stating "equal respect for autonomous citizens means that the state 
should not only refrain from interfering with the exercise of this freedom, but also that 
it should equally protect and, if necessary, support it."). 
85. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 132-33 (stating that "a special right of religion 
declares that government must not constrain religious exercise in any way, absent an 
extraordinary emergency. The general right to ethical independence, on the contrary ... 
limits the reasons government may offer for any constraint on a citizen's freedom at 
all."). 
86. Id; see generally LABORDE, supra note 1, at 30-33; SULLIVAN, supra note 35, 
at 1-4 (discussing the definition problem of religion). 
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that atheism is father to immorality."87 It "protects religious conviction in a 
more subtle way as well: by outlawing any constraint neutral on its face but 
whose design covertly assumes some direct or indirect subordination." 8 
However, understanding religious freedom as a general right to ethical inde-
pendence might force people to adjust their religious conduct in a way that 
fits the rationale of laws that are not per se directed to them.89 Therefore, 
the generalist position argues that authorities should take into account 
whether the bans and other restrictions on a particular practice they propose 
or impose, are in fact targeting what one group might consider "a sacred 
duty" to comply with.90 If that is the case, "then the legislature must con-
sider whether equal concern . . . requires an exemption or other ameliora-
tion. If an exception can be managed with no significant damage to the 
policy in play, then it might be unreasonable not to grant that exception." 91 
However, the generalist says that when a religious practice "would put 
people at a serious risk that it is the purpose of the law to avoid, refusing an 
exemption does not deny equal concern. That priority of non-discriminatory 
collective government over private religious exercise seems inevitable and 
right." 92 Thus, there is no principled reason to exempt the followers of the 
Santo-Daime Church who drink ayahuasca tea that contains DMT. The jus-
tification to deny exemption is rooted in public health grounds. 93 Neverthe-
less, there is a principled reason to provide equal financial grants to 
religious organizations that reject same-sex couples and organizations that 
accept them. Dworkin equally explains the reason as to why we should 
finance these by stating: 
87. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 133-34. 
88. Id. at 134. 
89. Ronald Dworkin stated, "[i]f we deny a special right to free exercise of relig-
ious practice, and rely only on the general right to ethical independence, then religions 
may be forced to restrict their practices so as to obey rational, non-discriminatory laws 
that do not display less than equal concern for them." Id. at 135-36. 
90. Id. at 136. 
9 1. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 136-37. In the Netherlands, some members of the Santo-Daime Church, 
who have been prosecuted for the import or possession of ayahuasca tea were dis-
charged from prosecution. See also Wahedi, supra note 3, at 134-35. The lack "of any 
significant risks to public health" is the main reason for discharge. The ECtHR reached 
another conclusion on this matter and declared the applicants inadmissible as "the pro-
hibition of the possession for use of DMT was necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of health." Frinklin-Beentjesand Ceflu-Luz Da Florestav. The Netherlands, 
App. No. 28167/07, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 48 (2014). 
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Financing Catholic adoption agencies that do not accept same-
sex couples as candidates, on the same terms as financing agencies 
that do, might be justified in that way, provided that enough of the 
latter are available so that neither babies nor same-sex couples eek-
ing a baby are injured. 94 
D. Equation 
Equation requires equal respect for all deep concerns of people. Thus, 
in effect religious beliefs and practices, as they concern deep human con-
cerns, should not be favored over similar deep concerns of other citizens. 
Religious freedom should ensure this equal treatment of people. 95 Against 
this backdrop, equation opposes arguments that justify religious freedom in 
light of any "distinct value" of religious manifestations. Rather, it argues 
that believers' vulnerability to discrimination should be considered the main 
justification for religious freedom. In addition, equation opposes a "relig-
ious" understanding of religious freedom. In this sense, equation is very 
close to generalization. However, there are two main differences. First, it is 
not indifference or neutrality as such that requires principled equation.96 It 
is rather the idea of equality of treatment of all acts and thoughts that have 
an intrinsic value. 97 Second, equation does not generalize religious freedom 
to something like the general right to ethical independence and moral free-
dom.9 8 It rather approaches religious freedom from the principle of equality 
of treatment, which is considered the main constitutional value of a liberal 
democracy. 99 Therefore, the equation approach is part of what has been 
94. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 136. 
95. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion 
Is? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 834-35 (2009) (stating that "the point of the Religion 
Clauses is not to affirm (or deny) the value of religious practices, any more than the 
point of the Free Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag burning."). 
96. See Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEv. ST. L. 
REV. 493, 496-97, 520 (2009). 
97. See Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty 
and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, at 352 (2010) (arguing that some 
liberal theorists of religious freedom have "[attacked] religious exemptions on the gen-
eral premise that they are fundamentally unfair to nonreligious people."). 
98. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 51-77 (2007); see generally LABORDE, supra note 1, at 55-57; 
Lund, supra note 97, at 360 (critical of the theory developed by Eisgruber and Sager). 
See also Boyce, supranote 96, at 496-97 (differentiating between equality in treatment 
and equality in effect) (emphasis added). 
99. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 29 (arguing that egalitarian theorists of religious 
freedom advocate a regime in which "all citizens-traditionally religious or not-are 
treated with equal concern and respect, as free and equal citizens of a democratic soci-
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called the egalitarian theories of religious freedom.100 The question is, how-
ever, equation of what?10 1 At the outset, this position is anti-favoritism, 102 
and it advocates equal treatment of all conscientious manifestations and be-
liefs that contain an intrinsic value.1 03 
Recall the recent case of the Pastafarian who was denied by a local 
municipality in the Netherlands to submit a photograph with a pasta strainer 
on her head. Another Pastafarian who was similarly rejected by the local 
authorities, referred to the possibility of Muslims and Jews to submit photo-
graphs on which they have covered their heads. 104 
This case reminds us of a theoretical example about two people who 
do not share the same religion but share similar objections that give them a 
reason to ask for accommodation. A is a Jehovah's Witness and B is a 
ety."). See also Boyce, supranote 96, at 520 (stating that "[e]quality of treatment is the 
central principle of our constitutional order . . . [and] [t]o require or permit exemptions 
only for religious but not secular individuals profoundly violates that constitutional 
principle. Because the free exercise of religion necessarily entails the freedom to be-
lieve as well as disbelieve, granting exemptions only to believers also violates the core 
values underlying the Free Exercise Clause."). 
100. See C6cile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion and the Good?, in JEAN 
LOUISE COHEN & CECILE LABORDE (Eas.), RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 249 (2016) (discussing egalitarian theories of religious freedom). 
101. See LABORDE, supra note 1, at 89 (explaining what equation aims to realize. 
"On the one hand, people's ability to act in accordance with their deep commitments 
should not be subjected to unequal state burdens; on the other hand, the state should not 
endorse the symbols and rituals of dominant religions because they could be disparag-
ing to racial-like minorities."). 
102. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 149; see also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 42 
(elaborating on the egalitarian criticism towards religious accommodation, considering 
this as unfair and contrary to the liberal commitment "to neutrality about the good and 
equality between citizens"); Boyce, supra note 96, at 551 (arguing that in today's era of 
secularization a favored treatment of religious beliefs and acts is very problematic). 
103. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 98, at 51-77; see also Nehushtan, supra 
note 14, at 149 (commenting on the position of Eisgruber and Sager: "[i]t is possible to 
give a certain priority to religious reasons, not because of their content but rather for 
largely neutral reasons. Eisgruber and Sager, for example, take this line in suggesting 
that religion is distinctive rather than unique. They claim that religion, much like race 
and gender, justifies subjecting government's decisions to greater scrutiny than many 
other topics or policies receive."); LABORDE, supranote 1, at 51 (arguing that an egali-
tarian theory of religious freedom, as conceptualized by Eisgruber and Sager, is an 
"attractive" alternative for "those who worry that formal legal equality leaves minority 
interests at the mercy of majoritarian preferences yet see little justification for a [secta-
rian] privileging of religious interests qua religious."). 
104. Rb. Noord-Nederland 28 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2016:3626, ¶ 5.1 
(Neth.). 
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pacifist. A and B have objections to manufacture tank components.10 This 
example has been used by the proponents of the equation approach to argue 
that a legal regime that exempts A and not B is quite problematic. 106 This 
objection of improper distinction is present in the Pastafarian case. The 
equation position will ask why some believers, such as Muslims and Jews, 
are allowed to cover their heads on the driver's license photograph they 
submit, while Pastafarian believers are denied the same opportunity. 0 7 
Another appropriate example in this context is the ongoing debate in 
legal theory and society about the legal acceptability of ritual male circum-
cision. As such, several European courts have ruled about the legality of 
this practice. In this regard, one could refer to the German and Finnish court 
judgements. In both cases, the circumcision of young boys was followed by 
medical complications. Although the Finnish Supreme Court held that male 
circumcision, under particular circumstances, was an acceptable practice, 08 
the German district court in Cologne held that the irreversible character of 
this practice violated the boy's rights to religious freedom, as they were 
unable to give their consent. Next, the judges argued that the parental right 
to religious freedom and their right to raise their children by their convic-
tions, do not justify the practice of ritual male circumcision.1 09 The recur-
ring question is: what is the justification to keep on considering this practice 
permissible? The criticism is that all forms of female circumcision, better 
known as genital mutilation are prohibited. Even incision, which is less 
violable than ritual infant male circumcision. The difference in legal ap-
proaches has been criticized as discriminatory.110 The equation position, 
which advocates for a similar approach to religious and non-religious argu-
105. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1292. 
106. Id. 
107. However, the question remains: what kind of beliefs, convictions and prac-
tices should be equalized? In addition, how can the comparative framework be shaped 
in this respect? See also LABORDE, supra note 1, at 53 (arguing that "[the] category of 
non-religion is too loose and imprecise to serve as a comparator to that of religion."). 
108. Heli Askola, Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland, 25 
INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 100, 106 (2011). 
109. Landgericht Koln [The District Court of Cologne], 7 May 2012, 151 Ns 169/ 
11, 1 III. In applying the court's reasoning, the parental right to raise their children in 
accordance with their Islamic faith does not justify ritual male circumcision, which is 
considered an irreversible intervention that lacks consent and violates bodily integrity. 
Circumcision does not provide children with an opportunity to make independent deci-
sions regarding the religion they choose to adopt. Therefore, the decision to be circum-
cised must be postponed. 
110. Sohail Wahedi, Het beoordelingskadervan rituelejongensbesnijdenis [The 
assessment framework of ritual male circumcision], 7 TUDSCHRIFr VooR RELIGIE, 
RECHT EN BELEID [J. FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL'Y] 59 (2016). 
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ments concerning the way people want to live their lives, theoretically 
strengthens the criticism of "a double standard on the part of [those] who 
fail to challenge other unnecessary surgical interventions-such as male 
circumcision or cosmetic surgery-in their own communities and 
cultures.""' 
Thus, equation "requires simply that government treat the deep, relig-
iously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same re-
gard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally.""1 2 Meaning 
there is no principled reason to differentiate between deep human commit-
ments. The norm should be an equal approach to non-religious and religious 
perspectives on the ultimate questions of life. This argument rests on a defi-
nition of religious freedom that does not provide religion with a base for 
reproduction. The equation approach rethinks religious freedom as "the 
right of the individual . . . to life outside the state-the right to live as a self 
on which many given, as well as chosen, demands are made. Such a right 
may not be best realized through laws guaranteeing religious freedom but 
by laws guaranteeing equality."' '3 Therefore, the regime of religious tolera-
tion should be understood against the backdrop of human vulnerability to 
discrimination. Eisgruber and Sager states: 
[what] properly motivates constitutional solicitude for eligious 
practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their dis-
tinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection against dis-
crimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental concerns. 
When we have replaced value with vulnerability, and the paradigm of 
privilege with that of protection, then it will be possible both to make 
sense of our constitutional past in this area and to chart an appealing 
constitutional future.' 14 
This position allows us to claim that there are two main differences 
between generalization and equation. The first focuses on how we should 
understand religious freedom as a liberty. The second approaches religious 
freedom from the ideal of equality. 
E. Representation 
The main claim of representation is that the theory it has developed is 
not narrow in the sense of exclusively protecting one group. Hence, it is not 
111. Moira Dustin, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the UK, 17 EUR J. OF 
WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 8-23 (2010). 
112. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1283. 
113. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 159. 
114. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1248. 
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a sectarian theory of religious freedom. It is rooted, as Laborde says: "in the 
ecumenical value of ethical integrity, and in the normative justifications for 
generic liberal rights such as speech and association."" 5 Representation un-
derstands religion as a concept that stands for a set of protection-worthy 
values that are not necessarily "religious" in the core. 116 These values jus-
tify according to the representation position the codification of a special 
right to religious freedom." 7 As such, it has been argued that religion, like 
respect, stands for a "hypergood:" a particular category of higher goods.'s 
Koppelman argues that: 
[religion] . . . has a value that can override many other goods 
and preferences. But religion is one among many hypergoods. It 
should not be privileged over the rest of them. This fundamental 
problem of modernity should not be adjudicated by the state. The 
problem of determining the appropriate hypergood, if any, and its 
reconciliation with the broad range of ordinary goods, is a question 
that occupies the same existential territory as religion. If the state is 
incompetent to resolve religious questions, it is likewise incompetent 
to resolve this one.19 
115. The position this article qualifies as "representation" elaborates on the 
"proxy" and "disaggregation" approaches. See LABORDE, supra note 1; Laborde, supra 
note 20. 
116. See Ronan McCrea, The Consequencesof Disaggregationand the Impossi-
bility of a Third Way, in CECILE LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN 
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 69 (2017) (criticizing Laborde's disaggregation 
approach). 
117. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 Wm. & 
MARY BILL RTs. J. 303, 332 (2001) Rutherford argues that religion, within the context 
of U.S. constitutional law has a special status, not on sectarian grounds, but for the 
reason that religion serves very important functions. Rutherford identifies "four related 
functions that religion serves: (1) religion helps balance power and limit the power of 
both the government and organized faith; (2) religion sometimes enables disempowered 
groups to organize and increase their power; (3) religion produces values that are 
neither market-driven nor controlled by the government; and (4) religion provides a 
source of spirituality and personal identity that enables individuals to live with purpose 
and dignity."). See also Jamal, supra note 1, at 439 (defending religious freedom as the 
right that gives protection to the minority views); Lund, supra note 1, at 515 (arguing 
that "the way to protect all deep-and-valuable human commitments is by naming certain 
specific deep-and-valuable commitments. There is no other way. We start with the ones 
we know, and we keep an open mind about the rest. Religion is not the only deep-and-
valuable human commitment. But it is one of them, and that is enough."). 
118. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 594. 
119. Id. In his later publications, Andrew Koppelman has elaborated on consider-
ing religion a legal proxy. See e.g. Koppelman, How Shall I PraiseThee? Brian Leiter 
on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 961, 981 (2010) (stating "it is not 
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More specifically and to identify the relevant legal values religion 
stands for, the representation position reflects on the potential matches be-
tween the "different parts of the law" and "different dimensions of religion 
for the protection of different normative values."l 20 Examples of such 
matches are the presentation of religion as: a conception of the good life; a 
conscientious moral obligation; the key feature of identity; mode of human 
association; a vulnerability class; a totalizing institution and an inaccessible 
doctrine.121 According to the representation position, some of these 
matches, such as the presentation of religion as a conception of the good 
life, a matter of conscience, identity and association, are more "relevant to 
the notion of freedom of religion" than other overlapping areas.1 22 Hence, 
the representation position could be defined as "religion-blind without be-
ing religion-insensitive, because it sees religion, not as a specialised and 
self-contained area of human belief and activity, but as a richly diverse 
expression of life itself."1 23 
II. SHOULD THE LAW IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
CARE ABOUT RELIGION? 
Should the law in liberal democracies care about religion qua religion? 
What does the classification of the normative positions tell us about the 
"specialness" of religion? Thus, the question is: does religion qua religion 
possible to offer a unitary account of what religion is good for. Like a knife or a rock, it 
is something that people find already existing in the world, which they then put to a 
huge variety of uses. Religion denotes a cluster of goods."). This position has been 
defended more recently in ANDREw KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
NEUTRALITY 124 (2013). See also Koppelman, supra note 41, at 37 (repeating the view 
that religion encompasses many goods that people aim to purse and religious freedom 
enables them to do that). 
120. Laborde, supra note 20, at 594. 
121. Id. at 594-95. 
122. Id. at 595-97. The argument is that the values behind the identified matches 
are as such worthy of special legal solicitude. Thus, the representation position draws 
on the idea that the values behind a broad set of matches provide an appropriate base to 
justify the legal protection of religious beliefs and practices. 
123. Id. at 600. Formulated in this way, a religious way of life is just one way 
human beings could give moral substance to their lives. The normative argument behind 
this position is the classical liberal idea that authorities should refrain from dictating the 
right way of life. Citizens should find in freedom their desirable path to live their lives. 
Therefore, representation advocates "strong evaluations" to examine whether believers 
could be exempted from the application of laws that are at odds with their convictions, 
such as the prohibition of wearing headscarves and yarmulkes in public. The representa-
tion position claims that "the value of integrity" is the right interpretative value to deal 
with such "strongly valued practices" of the free exercise. 
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deserve special legal protection? At the outset there is no one right answer 
to this question. The classification of the normative approaches is an appro-
priate method to look beyond theoretical differences and figure out whether 
we can identify and subsequently theorize a binding element in the liberal 
theories of religious freedom. Thus, the focus is on the binding characteris-
tic of the argumentation patterns this article has conceptualized. 
A. Does Religion Qua Religion Require Special Legal Protection? 
This section classifies the types of responses that answer this question. 
This classification is based on how the normative positions this article has 
conceptualized in the development of its theoretical framework answer this 
question. The similarities between the responses uncover three categories of 
responses. First, a Strong No, religion does definitely not qualify for special 
legal protection qua religion. Second, a Soft No, religion does not necessa-
rily deserve special legal protection qua religion. Third, a Soft Yes, it is 
eligible for special legal protection, though not for distinctly religious rea-
sons.124 This section elaborates on these three responses and answers the 
more general question whether the law in liberal democracies should care 
about religion simply because it is religion? 
1. No, Definitely Not: The Strong No 
One potential answer suggests definitely not. The argument of this 
Strong No is that the concept of religion is on principled grounds not eligi-
ble for special legal protection qua religion. Thus, according to this answer, 
the concept of religion does not provide any room to support arguments that 
justify the special legal protection of religion with an appeal to the distinct 
values of religion. Therefore, this response rejects arguments as defended in 
the sectarian theories of religious freedom, justifying this liberty with an 
explicit appeal to values that can be considered distinctly religious, i.e. the 
transcendental value of religion 2 5 or what a particular religious dogma 
prescribes as protection-worthy.1 26 As such, the Strong No corresponds with 
the principled rejectionist answer to the question whether religion qua relig-
ion requires special legal protection. The rejectionist position understands 
124. I am grateful to Professor Steven D. Smith who challenged me to figure out 
what theoretical responses are possible to the question as to whether religion qua relig-
ion deserves special legal protection. The threefold response (the Strong No, the Soft No 
and the Soft Yes) is based upon his suggestion. 
125. McConnell, supra note 15. 
126. QANUNI AssAsSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IS-
LAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN], supra note 30. 
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"religion" as the combination of categorical commands that are insulated 
from evidence. 
Does this conception of religion make a strong case to tolerate religion 
qua religion? The principled rejectionist position suggests not. The argu-
mentation pattern to deny special legal protection to religion qua religion 
starts by defining what the notion of pure toleration requires. The principle 
of toleration requires that a belief or practice that is objectionable and that 
can be stopped by the dominant group in society, is nevertheless tolerated 
for principledreasons. These principled reasons of toleration find their ori-
gins in what morality and epistemology consider protection-worthy. Princi-
pled rejection says that toleration on moral or epistemic grounds does not 
require special toleration of categorical commands that are insulated from 
evidence (i.e. religion does not require special legal protection qua relig-
ion). In sum, the principled grounds for toleration do not provide a fruitful 
basis to argue that religion needs special legal protection qua religion. 1 2 7 
2. No, Not Necessarily: The Soft No 
Another possible response to the question whether eligion qua relig-
ion requires special legal solicitude concerns the Soft No. The Soft No re-
sponse entails that religion as such does not necessarily require special 
legal protection, nor is an explicit right to religious freedom required to 
guarantee the free exercise of religion. Reflecting on the justification 
grounds of the special legal solicitude towards religion uncovers that 
"other" broader faculties, liberties and vulnerabilities (i.e. the believers' 
vulnerability to discrimination due to their specific habits) require special 
attention and protection. This response considers religion a subset of these 
other broader faculties (e.g. conscience, ethical integrity and deep commit-
ments) that justify a distinct legal protection regime because of their partic-
ular specialness. In the same manner, religious freedom has been rethought 
as the right that provides protection to beliefs and practices that are not 
necessarily rooted in a theistic understanding of religion. As such, religious 
freedom has been presented as the right to ethical independence and moral 
freedom.1 28 Finally, religious freedom has been considered a subcategory of 
other constitutional freedoms that, without any doubt need codification and 
127. The position that religion qua religion does not require special legal protec-
tion corresponds with the position of Brian Leiter, who has stated that Kantian and 
utilitarian moral grounds as well as Millian epistemic grounds of toleration only make a 
strong case to protect equal liberty of conscience that encompasses the religious con-
science. Thus, there are no principled reasons to tolerate religious conscience 
separately. 
128. DWORKIN, supra note 13. 
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legal protection in liberal democracies (e.g. basic liberties, such as the free-
dom of conscience, thought, association and expression). Thus, for the justi-
fication of the right to free exercise of religion, the Soft No response does 
not necessarily rely on distinctly religious values. 129 Rather, it approaches 
religion and religious freedom from a broader framework of faculties and 
liberties. This response paves the way for the suggestion that there is no 
need for a constitutionally protected religious freedom that gives protection 
only to religious beliefs and practices. The conflicts between law and relig-
ion are manageable, even without an appeal to the distinct values of relig-
ion. The main message of this response is that although religion does not 
necessarily require special protection simply because it is religion, it de-
serves special legal attention under some other general and apparently non-
religious faculties, categories and rights, e.g. conscience, ethical indepen-
dence, moral freedom and a combination of basic liberties, such as the free-
dom of speech, association and expression. 
3. Yes, Though Not For Distinctly Religious Reasons: 
The Soft Yes 
The Soft Yes concerns the final possible response to the question 
whether-according to the liberal theories of religious freedom-religion 
qua religion deserves special legal solicitude. This response does not justify 
religious freedom with an explicit appeal to distinctly religious values. It 
implies a "yes" as it says that religion deserves special legal protection qua 
religion. However, it takes a "soft" turn immediately, as it is a liberal an-
swer that for principled reasons refrains from the adoption of an argumenta-
tion pattern that justifies the special legal protection of religion on the 
grounds that are perceived distinctly religious. Against this backdrop, the 
Soft Yes response corresponds with the representation position. The "yes" 
of this response suggests that religion is eligible for special legal solicitude 
as it represents a set of values and functions that are worthy of legal atten-
tion and protection. However, in correspondence with the "soft" nature of 
this response, these values are not necessarily religious. Recall the represen-
tation argument suggesting that religion stands for a proxy of goods, social 
functions and the pursuit of non-profit values that as such, justify the spe-
cial legal solicitude for religion. Thus, the Soft Yes response entails that 
religion deserves special protection in law, though not necessarily for rea-
sons that find their origins in the distinct value of religion. 
129. The Soft No response corresponds with the substitution, generalization and 
equation positions. 
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B. The Synthesis of Abstraction From The Religious Dimension 
This article has focussed on the liberal theories of religious freedom 
and their main contribution to the debate on the role and place of religion in 
law. Based on this, Part I has developed a conceptual framework that con-
sists of normative positions, each theorizing a particular approach towards 
religion and religious claims for exemptions from laws. The argumentation 
patterns of this conceptual framework have proved to be useful in answer-
ing the question whether religion qua religion deserves pecial legal protec-
tion in liberal democracies. The question remains however, whether the 
threefold response to the special legal solicitude towards religion (the 
Strong No, the Soft No and the Soft Yes), provides a fruitful base to identify 
and subsequently theorize a particular feature that can serve as the binding 
element of the liberal theories of religious freedom. To this end, it is impor-
tant to figure out what the overall message of the threefold response may be 
concerning the question whether eligion qua religion requires special pro-
tection in law. 
The clear message across the three types of responses is that distinctly 
religious values are not considered eligible to justify the special legal solici-
tude towards religion. Thus, the synthesis of this threefold response is the 
dismissal of the special legal protection of religion qua religion. Moreover, 
this synthesis renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an 
appeal to any distinct value of religion. What clarifies and justifies the spe-
cial legal attention for religion is a broader and apparently religion-empty 
(i.e. free from distinctly religious values) framework of faculties, liberties 
and vulnerabilities.1 3 0 The question is, what does this predominantly nega-
tive answer to the question as to whether religion qua religion requires spe-
cial legal protection suggest about the binding feature of the liberal theories 
of religious freedom? Can we say that the threefold response that we have 
given is an illustration of "decoupling religion from a god?"1'3 Alterna-
tively, does the synthesis of our threefold response fit the "tendency, among 
legal practitioners, to re-describe" religious matters in non-religious 
terms? 132 
130. LABORDE, supranote 1, at 42 (criticizing the "vague" broader framework that 
is adopted by egalitarian theorists of religious freedom to justify the special legal solici-
tude towards religion). 
131. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 132 (stating that "the problems we encountered 
in defining freedom of religion flow from trying to retain that right as a special right 
while also decoupling religion from a god."). 
132. Laborde, supra note 20, at 590 (arguing that "there has been a tendency, 
among legal practitioners, to re-describe [particular religious] practices in the language 
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The synthesis of our negative response ncompasses both when it re-
acts to the justification grounds of the special legal solicitude towards relig-
ion. It decouples religion from any God. Essentially, it presents religion as 
one subcategory in the more general and apparently non-religious catego-
ries of human conscience and the conceptions of the good life. It decouples 
religion from any God in a further sense. The threefold response conceptu-
alizes religion in a God-empty way, free from distinctly religious values. 
An appropriate example of a God-empty conception of religion is the defi-
nition of religion as the combination of categorical demands that are insu-
lated from evidence and reason. 133 Other God-empty conceptions of religion 
are concerned with the identification of general and apparently non-relig-
ious values that are as such worthy of legal protection. Examples of such 
intrinsic and valuable aspects of religion are the values behind human con-
science, 134 ethical integrity,1 35 deep ethical commitments, 136 hope,1 37 vulner-
ability to injustice,1 38 and so on. These valuable-though not specifically or 
distinctly religious-aspects to religion justify as such the special legal pro-
tection of religious beliefs and manifestations. 
The synthesis of our threefold response fits similarly the tendency of 
re-description, which suggests that for the legal analysis of a case of relig 
of conscientious obligation, so as to accommodate them under the label of freedom of 
religion."). 
133. LEITER, supranote 21, at 33-34. Koppelman is critical of Brian Leiter's con-
ception of religion, referring to it as "a radically impoverished conception." Koppel-
man, supra note 119, at 962; see McConnell, supra note 18, at 784 (suggesting, "it is 
futile to draw up a list of features descriptive of religion and only of religion. What 
makes religion distinctive is its unique combination of features, as well as the place it 
holds in real human lives and human history.") See also Frangois Boucher & Cicile 
Laborde, Why Tolerate Conscience?, 10 CRIM. L. & P-m. 493, 496 (2016) (stating 
"Leiter fails to establish insulation from reasons and evidence as the demarcating fea-
ture of religion. This is because he draws on incompatible interpretations of 'insulation 
from reasons and evidence' to reply to different challenges regarding either the under-
inclusiveness or the over-inclusiveness of his definition of religion."). 
134. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168-69. But see KOPPELMAN, supra note 119, at 
153 (arguing that "[i]t is not clear how Nussbaum can maintain the distinction between 
her position and a libertarian view in which any regulation of anyone's conduct is pre-
sumptively invalid . . . [As such], [t]he boundaries of protection in Nussbaum are thus 
uncertain."). See also Laborde, supra note 20, at 589 (arguing that the substitution posi-
tion is not able to provide equal protection to all religious practices that are valuable, 
though not always on conscientious grounds). 
135. Laborde, supra note 20, at 589. 
136. DwoRKIN, supra note 13, at 5. 
137. KOPPELMAN, supra note 119, at 122. 
138. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 1248. 
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ious manifestation, it is neither necessary, nor useful to define or understand 
that case in specific and distinct religious terms. This tendency of re-
description arises from projects that aim to rethink religious freedom in a 
religion-empty way that is not only protecting theistic beliefs and manifes-
tations. The normative argument is that both theistic and non-theistic beliefs 
and manifestations that have an intrinsic value, which attaches to valuable 
aspects of a human life, should be treated with the same amount of respect 
and concern. For this reason, religious freedom has been rethought, ap-
proached and defended as the liberty of conscience, 1 3 9 the right to moral 
freedom,1 40 the right to ethical independence'41 and the citizens' equal right 
to live outside the state.1 42 
So far, we have argued that the synthesis of our threefold response 
decouples religion from any God and relies mainly on a non-religious lan-
guage to re-describe religious matters.1 43 The question is whether we could 
provide a more coherent description of our synthesis that encompasses both 
the decoupling side as well as the re-description aspect of the debate in 
jurisprudence about law and religion. In other words, is it possible to iden-
tify and subsequently define in a more systematic way the feature that 
serves as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of religious free-
dom? This feature looks beyond the varieties of normative positions and 
connects these perspectives from their common point of focus: the justifica-
tion grounds for the special legal protection of religion. With this presump-
tion in mind, we can say that the starting point of our reflections for the 
identification of the potential binding element of the liberal theories of re-
ligious freedom is the interpretative concern of these theories about the 
properlegal definition of religion and religious freedom and the fair appli-
cation of this specific definition in practice. This interpretative concern 
guides us to define the binding characteristicof the liberal theories of relig-
ious freedom. First, we have seen that these theories aim to provide the 
most appropriate definition of religion in law. Second, they have one impor-
tant concern: the egalitarian attention to fair treatment of deep human com-
139. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 89; NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 
169. 
140. Perry, supra note 20, at 996. 
141. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 130. 
142. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 159. 
143. Cf McCrea, supra note 116, at 71 (arguing that religion does not exist in the 
disaggregated form); Peter Jones, Religious Exemptions and DistributiveJustice, in Ct-
CILE LABORDE & AURPLIA BARDON (EDS.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY 162 (2017) (explaining that the non-religious description of religious exemptions, 
such as the use of a cultural frame, fits the egalitarian strategy to defend religious ex-
emptions on non-sectarian grounds). 
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mitments and beliefs. Hence, the binding characteristic we aim to theorize 
is a normative response to the question: how should liberal democracies 
understand and accordingly deal with the concept of religion in law? This 
binding feature of the liberal theories of religious freedom encompasses the 
entire body of arguments that pave the way to deal with the indicated inter-
pretative concern of the debate about he role of religion in law within the 
paradigm of liberal political philosophy. The binding characteristic we aim 
to define takes the form of an interpretativeshield: it is embedded in philo-
sophical arguments that can resist the justification of religious freedom with 
an appeal to distinctly religious values. In addition, it draws on a non-secta-
rian language to conceptualize religion and religious manifestations. 
What does this interpretativeshield suggest about the binding feature 
of the liberal theories of religious freedom? DoeA it help us to provide a 
more coherent definition of our synthesis that covers the decoupling and the 
re-description aspects of the law and religion debate in jurisprudence? Yes, 
it does. The negative answer to the question as to whether religion qua 
religion requires special legal protection stands for abstractionfrom the re-
ligious dimension. Thus, abstraction is the binding element of the various 
normative positions discussed in this article. Abstraction dismisses argu-
ments that justify the special legal solicitude towards religion qua religion. 
Moreover, it renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an 
appeal to any distinct value of religion. Subsequently, abstraction proposes 
a general framework of ecumenical values that justify free exercise of relig-
ion and it rethinks religious claims for exemptions from laws, from that 
general framework of ecumenical values. 4 
144. See Wahedi, supra note 3, at 134. In earlier research that aimed to provide a 
better understanding of how contentious religious manifestations were presented and 
framed in contemporary legal, political and societal debates, abstraction was introduced 
as a mechanism that, by the use of different rhetorical means and arguments, marginal-
ized or even disregarded the specific religious dimension of a particular religious mani-
festation. This research suggested that the mechanism of abstraction covered at least 
three different approaches to deal with contentious religious practices: marginalization, 
neutralizationand reframing of the religious dimension. 
Marginalizationconceptualized the entire body of arguments suggesting that the 
religious dimension is not sufficiently distinctive or important for understanding a relig-
ious manifestation and therefore this particular dimension could be ignored largely in 
the legal assessment of the religious manifestation at stake. For example, the former 
Dutch Minister of Justice compared face-covering veils to nudists, leaving aside the 
religious significance of covering the whole body. Cf also the suggestion of Professor 
Ellen Hey on a draft version of my PhD proposal: "[a]bstraction is an omnipresent but 
little noticed phenomenon in the marginalization of religious values." (available upon 
request). See also Wibren van der Burg, Homogeniteit versus diversiteit - schuivende 
verhoudingen [Homogeneity versus diversity - sliding relationships], 5 RELIGIE & 
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III. ABSTRACTIONS FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION 
DISENTANGLED 
The dismissal of the arguments that aim to justify the special legal 
protection of religion qua religion, which is the origin of abstraction, takes 
place at different levels. As such, abstraction dispenses with philosophical 
arguments in mind the special legal protection of religion qua religion, at 
the conceptual level of religion, religious values, constitutional value of 
religion and finally at a practical level-the protection of the free exercise 
of religion in practice. The overall claim is that for the analysis of a clear 
case of religious manifestation, such as ritual male circumcision or wearing 
headscarves and yarmulkes, it is neither possible, necessary, nor useful to 
SAMENLEVING [RELIGION & Soc'v] 103 (2010) (discussing the marginalization of the 
religious dimension). 
Neutralization conceptualized the body of arguments suggesting that religious 
freedom is superfluous, as other fundamental rights-e.g. free speech and the freedom 
of association-provide enough protection to religious manifestations. As such, this 
approach aimed to "neutralize" the religious dimension of a manifestation as a matter of 
speech or association. An example is considering a Church's decision to ban female 
priests as a matter of freedom of association. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 98, 
at 63; Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women's Blue 
Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate,in MICAH SCHWARTZMAN, CHAD FLANDERS & 
ZoE ROBINSON (EDS.), THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 77, 88 (2016) 
(stating that "[the] group-centered right of close association, like the dyadic version of 
the right, offers a justification for the right of the Catholic Church to discriminate in its 
choice of priests. And . . . the group-centered right is in principle available outside the 
realm of religion. Here there are numerous possibilities. The Thursday Club is an obvi-
ous candidate; so too might well be the Tarpon Bay Women's Blue Water Fishing 
Club."). 
Reframing conceptualized the body of arguments suggesting that there is a shift 
away from the traditional frame that a particular religious manifestation is supposed to 
be protected, based on religious freedom, unless there are strong reasons (e.g. violation 
of other fundamental rights) to restrict it. The new alternative frame starts from the 
description of a contentious manifestation as primafacie unacceptable and merely asks 
whether it might nevertheless be tolerated on the basis of religious freedom. Thus, the 
burden of proof is completely reversed. An appropriate example is male circumcision. 
The legal permissibility of this practice was rarely questioned in the past as it concerned 
an admissible religious manifestation. Today, a shift is visible towards the idea that 
ritual infant male circumcision is unacceptable as it concerns a harmful manifestation 
that violates fundamental rights. See DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME RE-
FLECTION. TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994); 
See also Abbie J. Chessler, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. 
REV. 555 (1997). But cf. Rhona Schuz, The Dangersof Children'sRights' Discourse in 
the PoliticalArena: The Issue of Religious Male Circumcisionas a Test Case, 21 CAR-
DOZO J.L. & GENDER 347 (2015). 
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describe or understand such type of cases in specific and distinct religious 
terms. 145 
A. The Concept of Religion 
Abstraction focuses at this level on the interpretative concept of relig-
ion.146 In general, it does not describe religion in distinctly religious terms, 
but instead it defines religion broadly, that is to say in non-religious 
terms.14 7 The argumentation pattern of this step of abstraction focuses on 
what religion entails and identifies the characteristics that follow from that 
question in non-religious terms. Recall, the conception of religion as a com-
bination of categorical demands to act and beliefs insulated from evidence 
and reason. These features of religion do not justify singling out religion 
qua religion. 148 Hence, in the case of conflict of norms, the concept of 
human conscience provides a fruitful base to solve that conflict. Thus, relig-
ion is a subset of human conscience. That faculty, conscience, is worthy of 
protection and not religion as such.1 49 Another non-religious and general 
definition of religion is embedded in the philosophical idea that says, the 
category of religion stands for deeply held ethical commitments of human 
beings to succeed in life.' 50 In these definitions of religion, there is abstrac-
tion from the religious dimension, as for the description of religion they do 
not refer to distinctly religious values.'5 ' Accordingly, religion has been 
defined religion-empty,1 52 and the language that has been used to talk about 
religious manifestations is merely religion-empty.15 3 
145. The interplay and confrontation between theories of religious freedom and 
debates about concrete cases of free exercise will have an indispensable theoretical 
value in defining the latitude of abstraction. 
146. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 30 (arguing that egalitarian theorists of religious 
freedom elaborate on "an interpretative, not a semantic, conception of religion."). 
147. Id. at 31 (stating that egalitarian theorists of religious freedom focus mainly 
on what is potentially "protection-worthy" about religion). 
148. Id. at 28 (stating that "religion may be paradigmatic of beliefs, identifica-
tions, and practices that people have a particular interest in pursuing in their own way, 
individually or collectively. But . . . while religion is a paradigm of those valuable 
concerns, it does not uniquely capture them."). 
149. LEITER, supra note 21, at 33-34. 
150. DwORKIN, supra note 13, at 114. 
151. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 32 (arguing that the category of religion has been 
defined less specific, "ethnocentric and biased" by the egalitarian theorists of religious 
freedom). 
152. This part points to the de-coupling process of religion from God. 
153. This aspect refers to the re-description process of religious matters in non-
religious terms. See LABORDE, supra note 1, at 14 (criticizing the liberal religion-empty 
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B. The Distinct Value of Religion 
The argumentation pattern of this step of abstraction focuses on the 
question whether religion is a valuable category in law. Although the argu-
mentation framework does not doubt that the category of religion can have 
particular values, such as balancing the power and mobilizing people to do 
non-profit work,1 54 it shifts from these values towards a more general and 
broad (i.e. less sectarian) framework of values when it aims to justify the 
special legal solicitude towards religion. This shift results in the claim that 
religion as such does not have a distinct value and the values attached to 
religion are general of nature. Thus, there is abstraction from values that are 
considered distinctly religious, such as the transcendental and suprarational 
values of religion,'55 towards a more general framework of values, such as 
those concerning the human conscience,1 56 ethical integrity'57 and ethical 
commitments. 58 Hence, what has been presented as a distinct value of re-
ligion fits more general values. Therefore, the argument to justify the dis-
tinct value of religion and accommodate accordingly a particular religious 
manifestation applies simultaneously to comparable non-religious practices, 
arguments and projects that ask for exemptions.'5 9 One might think of the 
desire to become a vegetarian and the desire of not eating pork meat for 
religious reasons. 60 The value of both cases at this level of abstraction is 
similar, as being a vegetarian or refraining from eating pork can be under-
stood in terms of acting in accordance with deeply held ethical commit-
ments about how to live a life. 
The argumentation pattern at this level of abstraction entails that it is 
not necessary to rely on transcendental (meaning sectarian) grounds to jus-
tify the free exercise of religion.'6 1 
concept of religion and stating "that the analogy between religion and "conceptions of 
the good" (or similarly loose terms) is unsatisfactory, and that the slogan "equal liberty" 
sometimes obfuscates what is being equalized."). 
154. Rutherford, supra note 117, at 332. 
155. See generally McConnell, supra note 15. 
156. See generally McConnell, supra note 26. 
157. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168-69; KOPPELMAN, supra nOte 119, at 
153; Larbode, supra note 20, at 589. 
158. See Laborde, supra note 20, at 589-90. 
159. See May, supra note 40, at 191 (arguing that non-religious moral projects 
could be worthy of legal protection, as some religious moral projects require 
exemptions). 
160. See MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 77. 
161. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 28 (rejecting the idea that religion is special, 
meaning "that religious citizens should receive uniquely privileged treatment in the 
law-say, in the form of exclusive exemptions on the ground of religious belief. Relig-
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C. The Consitutional Value of Religion 
The argumentation pattern of this level of abstraction draws on the 
conclusion that religion does not have any distinct value that might justify 
the special protection of religion qua religion.1 6 2 Instead, a broader category 
that encompasses religion is worthy of legal protection, which could be the 
liberty of conscience, the right to ethical independence or the right to moral 
freedom. Also, the constitutional value of religion is defined in non-relig-
ious terms of liberal neutrality, which entails that free exercise of religion 
prohibits authorities from favoring or disfavoring a particular way of life, 
except in cases of harm prevention. Another constitutional value of religion 
is found in the way religious groups are vulnerable to discrimination. For-
mulated in this way, religious freedom covers the right that gives protection 
to general values, such as the ability to search for ultimate questions of life 
and the independence to have an attachment to ethical commitments and 
moral decisions about right and wrong. Therefore, for the legality of a relig-
ious manifestation, religious arguments do not count.163 One might think of 
the justification given to allow headscarves: it is not because of the special-
ness of your Gods that 'we' allow headscarves. It follows rather from our 
political commitment to respect human conscience. In this particular case, 
the constitutional value that justifies the allowance of headscarves is not 
found in religious arguments, but rather found in our respect for human 
conscience that is protection-worthy qua conscience. 6 
D. The Protection of the Free Exercise of Religion in Practice 
The argumentation pattern suggests at this level of abstraction that for 
the free exercise of religion a special right to religious freedom is not neces-
sary in practice. It is rather superfluous. The main argument is that the free 
ious beliefs and activities might be specially protected, but not uniquely so: if and when 
they are, it is as a subset of a broader category of respect-worthy beliefs and 
activities."). 
162. See Lund, supra note 1, at 494 (engaging in the debate on the constitutional 
value of religion inside secular states). 
163. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that egalitarians theorists of religious 
freedom do not ask "whether the law adequately captures what is ordinarily meant by 
religion. From a normative perspective, [they ask:] what is it about religion that is pro-
tection-worthy? What deeper normative values underpin protection of freedom of 
religion?"). 
164. See George Letsas, The Irrelevanceof Religion to Law, in CECILE LABORDE 
& AURELIA BARDON (EDs.), RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 44, 49 
(2017) (arguing that the concept of fairness could be used to explain and justify grant-
ing exemptions to religious manifestations). 
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exercise of religion is in fact guaranteed by a combination of different 
rights, such as the freedom of speech and association and the non-discrimi-
nation norm. The claim is that religious freedom does not add anything new 
to the existing body of basic liberties and human security rights.1 65 As some 
theorists of religious freedom have asked: do we need religious freedom to 
tolerate practices of gender discrimination that are clearly present in relig-
ious institutions? To argue why we do not need religious freedom in this 
context, they refer to a combination of basic liberties, such as freedom of 
expression, association and the more basic rule that says: in a free society, 
everyone should have the right to make choices regarding the establishment 
or disestablishment of relationships. 
This framework of general liberties helps us to understand why a clear 
case of gender discrimination in religious institutions that is considered a 
"contentious" religious manifestation, could be tolerated without any refer-
ence to religious freedom. The argumentation pattern at this level of ab-
straction entails that liberal democracies do not need religious freedom to 
deal properly with the legal admissibility of religious manifestations that 
are at odds with some basic liberties, such as the non-discrimination 
right.1 66 
E. Again: Any Reason to Care About Religion Because it in Religion? 
The theoretical suggestion that draws on the interpretative shield of 
abstraction says that it is not necessary to care in law about religion qua 
religion. Abstraction suggests that for the involvement in the law and relig-
ion debate, it is not necessary to be aware of what religion in the core en-
tails.'6 7 Thus, there is no need to take the sectarian transcendental or 
suprarational aspects of religion into account when we are dealing with 
questions of law and religion.1 68 Abstraction is in this sense religion-eva-
165. LABORDE, supra note 1, at 32 (drawing attention to a particular concern 
raised by some egalitarian theorists of religious freedom who argue that "freedom of 
religion protects a generic capacity, it can be adequately guaranteed through basic lib-
eral freedoms such as freedom of thought, speech, and association."). 
166. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 98, at 63. 
167. See John R. Munich, Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools: A Pro-
posed Standard, 24 ST. Louis. U. L.J. 379, 388 (1980) ("This definition does not con-
sider the content of the belief nor is it concerned with the institutional manifestations of 
a belief."). 
168. Traces of abstraction are visible in many debates about religious practices 
that are considered contentious, harmful or for different reasons just inappropriate to the 
ideals of liberal democracies. One example is the approach of some politicians to ban 
face-covering veils as a matter of security, emancipation and the social norm of being 
visible. Another example is the way courts have defined ritual male circumcision in 
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sive, which makes it abstractionfrom the religious dimension.1 69 The inter-
pretative shield of abstraction that suggests there is no need in law to care 
about religion simply because it is religion, is embedded in two philosophi-
cal premises. First, there is no distinctly religious-that is to say a transcen-
dental-justification for religious freedom (the opposition premise).170 
Second, the justification for free exercise arises from a framework of non-
sectarian values (the propositionpremise).171 In other words, there is no 
principled reason to adopt or to provide a sectarian understanding of relig-
ion to deal with questions concerning the free exercise of religion. Thus, the 
law in liberal democracies does not need to care about religion simply be-
cause it is religion. 
CONCLUSION 
Liberal theories of religious freedom have one important feature in 
common: abstractionfrom the religious dimension. Abstraction involves 
terms of bodily integrity, public health and the right to self-determination. Similarly, the 
proposed bans on ritual slaughter have been defended as a matter of "animal well-
being." Even though it is undisputed that ritual slaughter and male circumcision are 
inherently related to Judaism and Islam, abstraction largely leaves aside the religious 
dimension of these acts and almost only secular values, presented as universal and gen-
eral, are decisive in the assessment of the legality of such manifestations. The Dutch 
debate on the relationship between law and religion should be understood against the 
backdrop of two factors. First, the Dutch history of multi-religious minorities has never 
meant a total freedom to religious manifestations in public (e.g. the partial prohibition 
of religious processions until the late eighties of the last centuries). Second, the situation 
of relative religious toleration based on the presence of a multitude of seemingly perma-
nent religious minorities has substantially changed over the last five decades. See 
Wahedi, supra note 3, at 134; Geurt Henk Spruyt, Politiciansand Epidemics in the 
Bible Belt, 12 UTRECHT L. REv. 114, 124 (2016); Marjolein van den Brink & Jet 
Tigchelaar, Shaping Genitals, Shaping Perceptions:A FrameAnalysis of Male and Fe-
male Circumcision, 30 NETH. Q. Hum. RTS. 417 (2012) (utilizing different frames to 
discuss the legal admissibility of male and female circumcision). 
169. It is reasonable to argue that when the religious dimension of a contentious 
manifestation is translatedto a framework of general legal terms, such as, bodily integ-
rity or gender equality, the original religious dimension (e.g. the Jewish Covenant the-
ory that is of importance for circumcision) becomes completely superfluous. Thus, a 
very particular dimension that is considered special by a particular group of people 
(believers) is abstracted from that area and subsequently discussed in abstract terms. 
170. This premise corresponds with the suggestion that abstraction dismisses ar-
guments that aim to justify the special legal protection of religion qua religion. 
171. This premise corresponds with the suggestion that abstraction proposes a 
more general framework to justify free exercise and it rethinks religious claims for 
exemptions from general laws, from that particular framework of general values. 
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arguments that advocate the adoption of a non-sectarian, God-empty and 
religion-empty understanding of religion in law. This common feature of 
the liberal theories of religious freedom dismisses arguments justifying the 
special legal protection of religion qua religion. Moreover, abstraction re-
nounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an appeal to any dis-
tinct value of religion. Subsequently, abstraction proposes a general 
framework of ecumenical values in order to justify the free exercise and it 
rethinks religious claims for exemptions from general laws, from that 
framework of non-sectarian values. 
